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Draft Recommendution
on the future role of WEU -
reply to the snnual report of the Council
The Assembll',
O Recallurg the pivotal role WEU must play so that Europe can estabhsh an efficient and credrble
secunty system,
(rt) Acknowledgurg that soveretgn states are central to the process of framing and implementrng a
European defence policl'.
(iii) Recalhng that although the European Union's CFSP rmplies a decision-makrng process bv a qualified
majont-v, compliance wrth the pnncrple of unaninuq' rs essential for the protection of the vrtal secuntv
rnterests of every member state, wherever these ma1'be called into quesflon;
(w) Stressing that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty rmplies the guarantee of the temtorial rrtegnlv
of the member sLates and solidaritl,among them as soon as there is any riolation of the frontiers of anv one of
their number, and recallurg that an1' organisation of European secunty requires a guarantee as to comphance
with ttus pnnciple;
(v) Notrng with satisfaction that the Atlantrc Alliance has recogrused the exstence within rt of a European
secunty and defence identrty (ESDI), the pnncrpal component of ufuch is WEU,
(w) Stressrng the need to strengthen workrng relations and cooperation urth European states that are
members or about to become members of NATO.
(vn) Recallurg that under the modrfied Brussels Treat1,. an essential objective assigned to WEU rs that of
organising member countnes' involvement rr the Atlantic Alhance:
(wl Noturg, moreover, that WEU is rncreasingly drrectrng its efforts tou'ards the tasks it set forth rr its
I 992 Petcrsberg Declaratron.
6x) Stressrng that any WEU actron taken under Artrcle MII of the modified Brussels Treaty to maurtaur
peace rr the world and establish an order of peace and secunty in Europe cannot be confined to the executron
ofPetersberg tasks;
(x) Notrng that urvolvement ut Petersberg tasks N open to countnes that have not subscnbed to collcctrve
defence cornmltnents;
(n) Notrrg the progress made rn makrng WEU more operational wrth a view to it.
(a) fulfilhng tts collectrve defence commrtrnent under Artrcle V of the modrfied Brussels Trealv, and
(b) carrlmg out Petersberg tasks usrrg rts own assets or drawrng on CJTFs once thel, have actualll'
been set up:
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(nr) Expressrng the rvish that member states should conturue urth their endeavour to pool nulitary, and
technological rcsources and make them avarlable to WEU. ufuch u'ould enable the Orgarusatron to:
(a) strengthen the European secunlv and defen0e identrty withrn the Alliance, and
(b) make a practrcal contnbutron to framing a European secunt)' policy rn the frameuork of the
CFSP,
(xiu) Noturg uith concem the difficultl'European Uruon member sLates are halrng rn reachrng a consensus
rn the IGC on the rrorkrng of the CFSP;
(nv) Regretturg that a vcar after its submrssion rn November 1995 of the "WEU contnbution to the
mtergovemmental conference of the European Uruon tr 1996", the Councrl of Mrmsters has not seen fit to
update rts text to take account of nerv facts such as recogrution of the need to develop the European secuntv
and defence rdentrty'uithrn NATO.
(xv) Notrrg that a nnjon[' of WEU govemments are in favour of the gradual ntegratron of the
Orgarusation rn the European Uruon and reaffirmrng the Assembll/s consensual nerv. expressed at the
London extraordrnary session ur February 1996, that such rntegration cannot take place untrl membershrp of
WEU and the European Uruon is identrcal;
(m) Stressing that for thrs process to u'ork. there must be an unequrvocal political and financial
commrtnent on thc part of WEU and EU Govemments to clearll, defined and shared comrnon forergn and
defence policy oblectrves.
(wu) Considerurg that Europe's defence rs at present pnmanll' assured by NATO, wfuch makes permanent
consultauon and dialogue on an equal footrng urth the Uruted States and Canada essential on all matters
relatrng to secunty and defence structures rn Europe;
(wur) Statng its xilhngrress to continue and develop its exchanges u'ith the European Parliament. on an equal
and reciprocal basis, rn areas rn ufuch thel'have common responsrbilrtres, particularll'the CFSP,
(nx) Stressurg the need for the Council to clearlv state its riervs on the effect European Union and NATO
enlargement to rnclude cerlam ccntral Europcan countries urll have on their status rn WEU and their nghts
and obhgations m relation to rt.
(xx) Takrng thc uerv that WEU should pa1'particular attention to ts relafions urth those assocnte partners
that rrrll not be admrtted ur thc near future to the structures of the Atlantrc Alhance and the European Union,
and also to its contacts with Ukrarne;
(wt) Considenng that lhe status qtrc tn C1prus is not acceptable and that an early and iust scttlement of the
Cyprus issue u'ould strengthen secunh'and peace rr the Mcdrterranean;
(nry' Consrdenng furthcr that the acccsslon of Cyprus to thc European Uruon, the negotiations for which are
scheduled to take placc urthrn six months of completion of the rrork of the IGC, urll have a drrect rmpact on
the rnstrtutronal status of Crprus ruthm WEU.
(xxtu) Ferventll,hoprng that the WEU Councrl urll rntensrfir its efforts regardrng Afrrcan nsues in order to
contnbute to the search for a solution to the cnsis takrng place on the border betueen Zare and Rw'anda;
(wtv) Regreurng that the Council's replies to thc recommendatrons adopted at the extraordinary session in
l,ondon rn Fcbruary 1996 have been drlatory and lackrng in substance,
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(or) Deepll' regrettrng that ur sprte of numerous requests. no specrfic urformation has been made available
by the Secretary-General, the WEU Presidencv or the European Uruon Presrdency regardrng drscussrons on
those aspects of the EU rntergovemmental conference u.hrch are at present the prerogatrve of WEU and rts
Parliamentary Assembly;
(.ruy' Remrndrng all concemed that it wrll be for natronal parhaments to ratifl' u'hatever conclusions are
reached by the IGC:
(rvrrlNoturg once agam the delay'rr fonrardrng the first part of the Councrl's 42nd Annual Report, uhose
drspatch, wrthrn a reasonable period of trme, rs one of the terms of application of Artrcle IX of the modified
Brussels Treaty,,
RECOMMENDS TFIAT THE COTINCIL
l. Make an rnventory of every tlpe of asset the signatory states of the modified Brussels Treatl'are able
to deploy in a common defence. wrth a l,rew to drallrng up a European prograrnme for shanng defence costs
equitabll' betu een those countnes;
2. Make a srmlar rrventory of assets that can be deployed by WEU ln any Petersberg tasks, rvith a
to it gradually acquinng the capabilities necessary to carry out these tasks;
3. Strengthen to this cnd all those organs of WEU hkell' to be involved rr such tasks;
4. Expedrte the estabhshment of the Westem European Armaments Organrsation (\ ,'EAO) so as to bnng
together WEU actrvrties rn this field, rntegrate the European Armaments Agency and prolrde Europe wrth the
necessary structure for a proper common armaments pohcy,
5 Conturue to strengthen operatlonal cooperation urth NATO, startrng wrth implementation of the
decisions taken by NATO rn January 1994 and June 1996 concemrng the CJTF but without slackerung efforts
to mobrlise WEU's own capabilities for u:dependent actlon,
6. Promote, for tlls purpose, thc creatron of permanent representatrons of the Uruted States and Canada to
WEU and of WEU to those states.
7. Enhance its abilrty, withrn WEU, to implement Article \rIII of the modrfied Brussels Trealv rn order to
respond to emergencies and rr partrcular to take the necessan' decrsrons wrthout wartrng for such requests as
may come from the European Uruon, the Uruted Natrons or the OSCE;
8. Ensure applicatron of the pnnciple of the rnvrolabihS' of the temtonal rntegn[' and borders of the
European Uruon as constltutmg one of the oblectives of the CFSP. based on cntena that are gcneralh'
acc€pted rn international relations;
9. Ensure, furthermore. that the relevant European Uruon authonties are fully rnformed about the assets
WEU can make available to the Uruon for the purpose of carryrng out tasks entrusted to rt under the CFSP;
l0 Ask that the body' of the Trea[' u'hrch rs to be draftcd b1' the IGC nclude the pnnciple to uhrch the
Parliamentary Reflection Group on the 1996 mtergovemmental conference rcforred m Athens on 4 Dccember
1995, accordrng to wtuch fte WEU Assembly would be invited to contribute to thc work of the Conference of
European Affairs Commrttees (CEAC) rvhen matters conccrxng European sccunty rvere under discussion;
I l. Make clear u,'hat nghts and obligations the associate member, assocrate partrer and observer countnes
have m security and defence matters. prior to NATO and European Uruon enlargement;
vierv
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L2 Make representations to the mtemational orgarusations uith responsibility for the Cyprus problem,
urth a vterv to achievrrg an early settlement;
13 Ask the member states to make clear their mtentrons about a possible reusion of the modrfied Brussels
Trea[,that rvould take account of the decisions taken by NATO rr Berhn m June 1996, and of the results of
the IGC.
14 Develop cooperation on security matters urth those associate partrcrs that urll not be adnutted ur the
near future to the Atlantrc A-lhance and the European Uruon;
15 Update, rn tune for the WEU May 1997 mirustenal meetrng, the "WEU contnbutron to the
rntergovemmental conference of the European Union in 1996" u'hich rt adopted rn Madnd n November 1995,
taktng mto account rrtervemng developments such as the recogrutron by all WEU member states that the
European secuntl,and defence rdentrlv should be developed wrthrn NATO",
16. Step up relatrons on both a polrtrcal and practrcal level wrth the Russian Federatlon and wrth Ukrarne
and those CIS member states that so wish, so as to help attenuate fears and defuse tension that nught result
fromNATO enlargement;
17 Urgentll' estabhsh a mecharusm for keepurg the Assembly fully' urformed of drscussions and
developments in the EU mtergovernmental conference, on subjects wtuch are at present the prerogative of
WEU,
l8 Re-examrne Recommendations 589 and 590 on the political and defence aspects of the orgarusation of
secuntl' rn Europe. adopted at the extraordrnry sesslon ur l,ondon in February, 1996, wrth a view to seekrng
the same consensus as the fusembly on the @urse to be followed for the future of WEU;
19 Comply with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treatv by keeprrg the Assembly informed, by'the
proper tune lrml of all Councrl actmties and all aspects of Treaty implementation
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Liapis, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction: WEU in a changing world
l. The three ),ears remaiilng to the end of the
20ttr century wrll see a grcat many events whose
consequences for the future of WEU no doubt
present the Organisation with the greatest challenge
it has had to face for 50 years. The most stnkrng
fact that emerges from any examrnation is that the
decisions behind these events are bemg and wrll
continue to be taken by two other mstrtutions urth
whrch WEU has close lu*s, namely, the European
Uruon and NATO. This state of affarrs may well be
drsconcerting to those who would like WEU to play
a pivotal role m the debate on European secunty
and defence policies but rt is the result of an
rnstitutional tugof-war tlnt can only develop
through a gradual reinforcement, rn coordrnation
urth NATO, of WEU's operailonal capabilrtres and
rts adaptatron to the nerv geostrategic sltuation in
Europe and the world as a whole The success of
that process will enable WEU to play a more active
role rn rnproving security and stability on the
European conturent and any"w'here else ur the world
where the urterests of the member s[ates are at
stake.
2. We are currently ur a cnsis penod marked by
a great number of srtuations entarhng conflict and
armed struggle Some expcrts believe these to be
domestic matters for the indrvidual states urvolved
rather than issues concemmg mternational relations
The causes of some of these stuatrons are
essentrally domestic rn that they relate to political
issues (acts of terronsm, claims for independence,
drsputes of an ethmc or rehgious nature) or drsrupt
public order (drug trafficking, organised crime)
u'hrle others are regional and intemational problems
(Bosrua, Cyprus and the Middle East for nstance).
In fact there is no clear divrding hne between these
drfferent cases in terms of their impact on
worldlnde secunty. The rnstabrlrty bom of a
domeslc conflict ur a state affects the political and
regional secunty environment and possrbll' the
rntematronal climate. Thrs is the situation in central
Europe wrth regard to former Yugoslalra where an
intemal war of secession urtlm the former
Federation tumed into an rrtematronal confltct
involving first Uruted Nations then NATO
interventron, the latier through arr stnkes followcd
by the IFOR operation. Thrs same conflict has
repeatedly glven nse to drfferences betu'cen
European states as to whether armed interventron
u'ould have been appropnate rn the initial stages of
the conflrct and has served to tughhght present
deficrencies in terms of a common forergn and
secunq'pohcv.
3. The Medrtenanean reglon is also the scene of
an urcreasmg number of natronal, regronal and
rrtemational flashpoints. Terronsm by Mushm
fundamentahsts. the proliferation of all kinds of
weapons, political and economrc instabrlitv and
ongolng temtonal conflicts such as that rn the
westem Sahara, rvhere no lasting solution has 1et
been found, are but a few examples whcre
developments wrll have mnsequences for European
secunt,' and defence. Somc of these conflicts have
alreadl' been extended to the temtories of member
states of WEU and the European Uruon and have
revealed drfferences between European states rn the
rvay they perceive them. Although the conflrct ur
former Yugoslalra has been contaured over the last
five I'ears and nerghbounng countnes spared, rt has
nevertheless demonstrated the need for an
appropnate secunty system and defence capabrlrtres
to prevent a reneu'ed outbreak of r.rolence on the
same scale or to deal urth rt on the European
contment or rn neighbounng reglons WEU, the
European Uruon and NATO each have a
responsrbrlrty' rr creating the necessary condrtions
for establislung a secunty sl,stem m Europe. They
cannot achieve that objectrve through competitron
but only'b1'cooperatrng wrth one another and urth
other urstitutrons and states rn order to avoid a
retum to a policy of spheres of urfluence on the
conturent.
4. To adapt to changes ur the geostrategrc
situation, the European Uruon and NATO have
embarked on a series of reforms, the purpose of
rvluch ur every crtse, srmrlarly to that of industnal
restructunng, is to do more and do it better llrth
fewer resources. The unpetus givcn to
rmplementatron of the CJTF concept at the NATO
mrmstenal sumnut meetlng ln Berhn and
preparatrons for the first u'ave of enlargement come
at a trme rn'hen budget constraints, evcn m the
Uruted States, are rrflicting hear,y cuts on defence
budgets ufuch, ur their tum, entail big reductrons rn
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the manpox'er and equlpment emplol'ed in each
countnrs mrlrtary systems, their purpose berng to
concentrate resources on those areas consrdcrcd
most effective m strategrc terms. In practice a
consrderable share of resources is allocated to
mcreasrnglv costly high-tcchnologv items of
equrpment They are avarlable m loucr quantitv
than equrpment used pre'r.lousl1' and their use
requires more speciahsed and better trarncd staff
The rcsult of thrs technologrcal constramt rs a
consrderable reductron in manpou'er rn the armed
forces and a movc towards professional armres or a
hrgh proportron ofvolunteers. as rvell as the closrrg
doun of mrlrtarv rnstallations rncludrng nuclear
facilitres
5 Thrs rs only one of the factors to be bome rn
mrnd rr thc decisions on NATO rcforms Enlargrng
NATO to take m ne\\-members rs a hrglrll' pohtrcal
decrsion that takes account of the change rn the
geostrategic landscape of Europe smcc the collapse
of the Solret Uruon It rvas nel'er the rrtentron that
the Alhance should be a sclect club and it is only
natural that sovcrcrgn statcs applyrng to join should
ursh not onl1'to take part rn rts development but
also to benefit from the secunh'and stabrlrtv NATO
has for almost 50 r'ears afforded its European
members and ufuch have made a r,rtal contnbutron
to ther econorruc and socral progress, However. the
succ€ss of NATO enlargement rs ret to come and
the proccss must be open and clear if cnsis
situatrons and the emergence of "grev areas" of
sccunt)' in Europc are to be avorded
lmplemcntation of the CJTF concept meets an
operational need that has ansen from the
sigruficantlr' lorver numbcrs of US forces rr Europe
and from recognitron that onlv thc Uruted States
currently' has the logrstics and rntelhgence
capabrlrties necessan' for the effectrve execution of
mcdrum- or large-scalc mrlrtan' opcrahons of all
tlpcs in a part of the European continent or
elscu'here
6. Tumrng to the Europcan Uruon, there are
three aspects in the debate gomg on rn the IGC
rvhrch *rll also have repercussrons for WEU Thc
proc€ss of "deepcrung" appears to be based marrl1,
on a conccpt ofrntegratron hnked to the urtroduction
of the euro Adoptrng the srngle currencv urll have
sigruficant politrcal consequences. m secunh' and
defence among other areas, as a result of the budget
pohcies of the states partlclpatmg in the venture It
rzuses man)/ unknouns but the resolve of France
and Germanl'. u'luch are determmcd to persevere
ruth this course of actron. makcs rt r.rrtuallv
rrelrtable unless crther country does a malor U-tum
on European pohcy Enlargcmcnt too lvould seem
to be close to becomrng a realrtl' even though the
European Uruon has onlv recentll' taken rn three
nex' countries and the debate continues as to the
reforms that are needed to grve it politrcal clout
equal to its economrc clout Because of therr
geostrategrc situatron, the accessron of C1prus, and
then of ceftam central European countnes requires
the establishment of a genume common forergrr and
secunq' pohcy so that enlargement bnngs secunt'v
and stabili[' to those countries that are to join the
Uruon and to those around them that do not quahf,'
for membershrp for the trme berrg
7 The framrng of the common foreign and
secunq' policl', and evcntually of a European
defence pohcy, pnmanh' concems WEU as the
European Uruon's defence component lvtuch also
has responsibilrtv for defimng and rmplementrng a
European defence policy rn coordination lrith the
Atlantic Alliance. The issues described above call
for a rclrsed role for the Orgamsatron rn the
European polrtrcal and mrlrtary context. The
enlargement of the European Uruon and NATO.
rmplementation of the CJTF concept and the future
of the CFSP uill ur the long run mvolve ma.;or
changes rn the composrtion of WEU and rn its
uorkrng methods both m polrtrcal terms and 
- 
for
the first trme 
- 
rn mrlrtarv terms urth refercnce to
the use of NATO assets for conductrng its own
operatlons (peacekeeprng, humarutanan and, mdeed,
peace enforccment, and operatlons specificalll,
intended to defend member countnes' urterests) By
demonstratmg rts abrlrty'to adlust to thrs changrrg
envlronnent, WEU ffrr prove that is rt still highlv
relevant 
- 
evcn though the situation lustifirng rts
creation ur 1954 has changed radrcall,v 
- 
and that
thc defence of rts members and helpurg to mamtain
peacc. secunq' and stabrhq' on the European
contment and be1'ond are still its marn purpose.
II. Ihe current situation of
European security and defence
8 The penod of change and reform the
continent of Europe is expenencng at present has
brought uncertarntl'at every' level Irutiatrves have
burgeoned mto a uelter of proposals from one or
more states. mtematronal organisations or pressure
groups. in areas rangrrg from secunty to the
econom\'. Strmulating debate is, rn rtself, a posrtive
strateg),, pror,'rded it does not lead to paralysrs and
the krrd of entrenched political and rnstitutronal
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slatus quo that has becn all too apparent throughout
the cnsrs and u'ar ur former Yugoslavra. to mention
but one cxample. Today''s challenges: econorruc
rrtegration urthm the European Uruon (the advent
of the euro), the enlargement of the Union and of
NATO to urclude the central European countnes,
future relatrons urth the Russran Federatron and
urth Ukrame, not to mention thc need to frame a
ratronal European pohcl' 
- 
encompassrng both
economrc cooperatlon and secuntl' on the
Medrterranean and the Middle East. call for
practrcal responses that are polrtically vrsrble and.
most rmportant of all. credrble Whether the chorces
to be made rn those areas wrll prove correct can be
.ludged only b1'the results.
9. Europe as embodred b1 the European Uruon
and WEU must, rf it w'ants be able to mount an
effcctive defencc of rts rrterests m the u'orld, assumc
thc politrcal responsibilrtics that are conmensuratc
with its economic strength This means clanfi'rng
the respectrve areas of responsrbrhS' of both
orgarusatrons u'hen it comes to rmplementrng the
common forergn and sccuntv policy, and ultrmatell'
developing a European defence pohcl' At the same
trme, thel' need to asscrt themseh'es m relation to
other orgarusalons rvhich are takrng an ever more
pubhc stand on secuntv issues. regardless of the
fact that they havc no legal authon[' for dourg so or
the means of action to match therr ambfirons The]'
cannot succeed in this urthout the agreemcnt of the
member states of both orgamsatrons in order to
avoid intemal drvrsrons *hrch rvould hrnder the
progress of reforms, both present and futurc
Identrfication of the corrrmon intcrcsts of thc
member states and their polrtical solidantv are ver)'
important u'hen rt comcs to defence as thrs is an
area lvhich rs closelv linked rirth pcrceptions of
natronhood. as expressed by the govcmments and
parliaments m s'hom po\\'er of decrsron ur Europc is
vested.
(a) WEU and the defence of Europe
10. On the contment of Europe. tu-o
orgamsations, NATO and WEU, have defence
responsrbrlrties and capabilitics Both are engaged
ur reforms to enable them to adapt fullv to changes
rn the European and u,orld gcopolitical context.
NATO has the leadrng role both because rt has the
milrtarl' means to be effectlve, as its actron n
Bosrua has served to rllustrate, and because rt is the
embodrment of the United States' commrtnent to thc
dcfence of Europe, These are the plain facts and the
tu'o considerations that urll govem the tlpes of
change w,rought b1' enlargement and reorgarusahon
of the NATO command structures. both of rvhrch
must be camed out in such a wav as to preserv'e the
dehcate balance behvecn strengthcrung rvhat rs
termed a "European rdentr['" in NATO and
retarring the transatlantrc lrk. WEU. rr rts more
unobtrusrvc del'elopment, gives pnontl' to
cnhancrng rts operatlonal capabrlities to enable t m
due course to canl' out those mrlrtarl' operations
referred to as "Pctcrsberg-t1pc" mrsslons. if
necessan' draurng on defence assets made avarlable
to rt b1' the Alhance u'rthrn thc frameuork of the
CJTF agreement At the same time. WEU is
m'olved rn developrng a European defence pohcv m
conlunctron urth the European Uruon.
I I Apart from havrng srmrlar areas of
responsrbilitv. the tu'o orgarusatrons have rn
corrrmon the fact that thev are managed on iu1
rntergovemmental basis General pohcies are
defined by the member states on the basis of the
*rdest possrble consensus and subsequentlr'
rmplemented b1' the Secretanats-General and the
mrlitan, commands. Thrs approach. ri'luch ma1'
help explain the degree of hesitatron, lack of actron
el'en. tn the face of crisrs remains thc onll' r'ahd one
uhen deahng urth dcfence rssues, givcn that
national govemments and parhaments are pnmanly
responsrble for dcfining the overall drrectlon of
policy' and allocatrng the resources neccssarl' for
rmplementatron Thc pnmacv of the natron state
does not rule out the delelopment of brlateral
cooperation or cooperatron urthin organrsations
urth a polrtrcal and military rcmrt, rn an effort to
ratronahse countnes' defence commrtrnents at a ttmc
u'hen budget cut-backs ur that area arc the order of
thc day' Thrs is a reahh,all WEU mcmbers arc
facrng and one that s concentratrng minds in
mlrtarl' and mdustnal crrcles on the need for
Europe and its tradrtronal polrtical alhcs. both on the
contment and across the Atlantrc. to forge a true
dcfence poho' backed by' credrble merms
I The.frammg of a de.fence concept.for Ettrope
12 Artrcle V of the modrfied Brussels Trea['
pror,rdes that "rf any of the Fhgh Contracturg Parties
should be the object of an armcd attack rn Europe.
the othcr Hlgh Contractrng partres urll. in
accordancc urth thc pror"isrons of Artrcle 5 I I of the
I "Nothrng in thc present Charter shall impur thc
rnhcrcnt right of rndrvrdual or collcctivc sclf-defence
rf an armed attack occurs agalnst a Mcmbcr of the
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Charter of the United Natrons, afford the Par[, so
attacked all the mrlitary and other ard and assrstance
rn therr power". As the maur justification for
WEU's exstencc. tlus provrsion holds good even
todar,. desprte the changes that have occurred srrcc
1954. but rt has to be given a political and milrtarl'
content. It rs rn ttus lght that rt must define rts place
m the contment's secuntv strucfures as a uhole bv
reaffirmrng rts arms (as set out ur broad terms rn
Article V of the Treaty) and acquirurg the means
necessan, for rt to fulfil rts obhgations tou'ards its
members and. as neccssar)', to respond to requests
for assrstance from other European and
mternatronal rnstitutrons Whrle the creation of the
Satellite Centre and the conduct of mrlrtary
operations are clear elrdence of progress at
operational lcvcl, WEU has still not clearly stated
u'hat its rrtcntrons are as far as European defence
policl'goes and the most that can be said is that rt rs
supposed to be the European pillar of the Alhance
and be regarded as the dcfence component of the
European Uruon2.
13 Efforts have been made ln recent years to
meet expectatlons, rl partrcular at the Petersberg
mmrstenal meetrng, u'here a range of cases \terc
presented rn ufuch WEU nlght possibll'mtervene3,
and m Madnd urth the adoptron of a "common
concept" of Europcan secuntv That document
attempts to identifu present and future challenges
Europe and WEU ma1'have to face. listrrg the marn
nsks as potential armed conflrcts. proliferatron of
\\'eapons of mass destruction and their means of
convevilncc. lntematronal terronsm. orgarused
cnme. drug-traffickrng. uncontrolled and illegal
rmmrgration and emronmental nsksa. The
considerations cxtend to any'part of the uorld nhere
European mterests are mvoh'ed and proposals as to
the means of contendrng urth the problcms referrcd
Unrtcd NaIons, until the Sccurity Councrl has taken
mcasures necessarJ' to maintarn international peacc
and securih' rr
2 Houever, at mcetlngs bet*'een the Assemblr''s
Presidential Committee and the WEU Permanent
Councrl in Brussels on l5 October 1996.
parhamcntanans were rnformed that the expression
"Europcan secuntv and defence identitl'" rs currentlv
being uscd more than "European prllar".
3. Namelv. humanrtarian and rescue tasks,
peacekecping tasks and tasks of combat forces rn
crisrs management. rncludrng peacemaking.
Petersberg Declaration, II .l 
. Bonn. 19 June 1992
-[ European secuntv a common concept of lhe 2'7
WEU countnes, Chapter I I C., WEU Councrl of
Ministers- Madrid. I.1 November 1995.
to are advanced for adapturg natronal defence forces
x'hrle mamtaining their effcctrveness, strurgtherung
WEU's polrtrco-nulitary structures, rernforcurg
European assets and capabilrtres and enhancrng the
European defence rndustnal base'. Detarls are also
grven of the operational needs of the Orgarusation,
for example "a clear channel of commurucation
between the WEU Council and WEU forces" and a
"sngle cham of command", for efficient coordr-
natron rr the theatre ofoperations, for access to "an
adequate observatron capabilrtr'" and development
of "an intelligence processmg capabiliryr' and for
appropnate transport capabilrtres6.
14. The document also lists n full WEU's
rnadequacres rn terms of its command and control
procedures. rrtelhgence, strategic lift capabrlrtres,
rrteroperabrlrt_v and weapons policy Nevertheless rt
rarses at least tvro issues that glve nse to a degree of
confusron as to WEU's role rn relation to rts
foundrng Treaty.
- 
the collectrve defence task. u'luch is the
ven essenc€ of the modified Brussels
Treaty, is not mentioned at all.
reference rs made to the "27 WEU
countnes", wtule only ten of them are
par[,to the Trea['and participate fully ur
all the Organisation's actrnhes;
It may' also be mentioned rr passrng that no
reference rs made to central Europe x'hen listng the
regions u-here political circumstances and nsks have
implicatrons for the contrnent's security and no
detarls are glvcn of the secunty and defence
obligations and entitlements of countnes uith WEU
assocrate member. assocnte parmer or observer
status
15. While it bv no means has the scope of the
Romc Declaration of 1984 or The Hague Platform
of 1987. the document grves a farr indrcatron of the
polrtrcal mdecrsron and uncertarnty whrch have until
now prevented WEU from plaling a kev role rn the
European secuntv and defence architecture The
WEU fusembly' has for its part endeavoured for
)'ears to contnbute to the development of a polrtrcal
concept of Europe's defencp, hanng gone so far as
to propose. Irr l)91, that the modified Brussels
Idem. Chapter II. II D
Idem. Chapter II II B
5
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Treaty should be redrafted'. At the extraordrnary
session in London in February 1996, the Assembly
made an rmportant contnbution to the debate. by'
affirming that "the purpose of the modrfied Brussels
Treaty is to ensure the defence of member countnes,
promote European unih' and strengthen both
collective secuntv ur Europe and rvorld peace"E 
- 
a
most unportant reminder that WEU's task cannot
merely be reduced to the so-called Petersberg
operations, notuithstandrng thc emphasrs placed on
them m the "common concept of the 27 WEU
countnes"e, as the Assemblv notes u'hen it stresses
that "WEU's actrlrtres cannot be confined to
Petersberg tasks, rgrronng the core firnctions of
collective defence as defined ur Article V of the
modrfied Brussels Treatl'" I o.
16. Such are the topics that must be addressed
when consrdenng the future role of the Orgarusatron
if the latter is genuurell' to be the real European
pillar of NATO, the embodrment of the European
defence identrty and the defence arm of the
European Uruon. For tlus to be achreved. one basrc
condrtion has nevertheless to be met an
unambiguous and uncondrtional commrtnent from
present and future member states to the buildrng of
a collective secunty and defence svstem for the
contrnent as a whole. The hnk between the defence
of rrdrndual nations and that of Europe as a whole
has to be developed and strengthened if it is hoped
ultrmately to achieve the goal of an rntegrated
European defence ufuch takes as its startrng pourt
the identrficatron of natronal secunt_v and defence
rrterests and development of the coordrnation
necessary to bring about polic.v convergence WEU
can and must be the natural framework for such
coordrnation, notwrthstandrng dralogue and
cooperation u-rth the Atlantrc Alhance and the
European Union, srnce the rrtergovemmental nature
of its method of operation rmplies, first and
foremost, taking account of natronal perceptlons as
regards defence and ofnational defence assets
7 Recommendation 504 on thc rcvision of the
modified Brussels Treaty, Paris, 6 June 1991.
8. Recommendations 589 and 590 on organising
securit_v in Europe; recital 0, London 22-23
February 1996
9. Chapter II of the Madnd document is almost
exclusivel-v- devoted to the preventlon and
management of crrses; collectn'e defence is not dealt
u'ith separatelf in the text
10. Recommendatron 590 on organrsrng securrlv in
Europe, recfial (xv). London, 22-23 February 1996.
2. Interacfion befween nattonal and European
de-fence systems
17. National defence lies at the heart of the
prerogatives of state and govcmment, m Europc as
elseu'here. Intervention by armcd forccs ls
essentralll' a response to safcguard statc mterests.
even u'hen part of brlateral and multrlateral
uutratives and actron In thc minds of dccision-
makers and the pubhc at largc. notrons of defence.
temtonal mtegntl' and the rnviolabrlrtv of borders
remarn mextncablv hnked but the concept has nou,
mdened be1'ond these confines to mclude. for
cxample, economrc mterests and humamtan;m con-
srderatons. It rs to the latter that WEU's Petersberg
document refers. ufule defence of economlc
intcrests is alluded to rn Artrcle MII of the modrfied
Brussels Treatl'rl, although tlls aspect seems to
have been neglected someu'hat rn relatron to WEU's
actrlrtres desprte the rmpact of economlc
competrtion, or "economic x'arfare" as rt ls knoun.
on countries' securih, and stabrlrtl,. and hence on the
Orgarusatron as a u'hole.
18 In terms of national defence thnkrng m
recent )'ears. the economy has bccomc onc of the
main areas for consrderation In thc malontl' of
WEU member countnes. the end of the cold u'ar has
led to major budget reductions and rcforms urtlm
the armed seruces The cnsrs and rvar in the Gulf
accelerated the proccss. producu:g a model of
uarfarc based on a combrnatron of hrgh+ech
equipment and hghl]' mobrle human resources
comparatrvch' feuer m number than in the past.
although t rs true that that particular \\ar \\'as
rvaged a long ll'al' from national borders agaurst a
countrl'u,hosc means \\'ere not comparable to those
of thc multinational coalition u-here resources ul
tcrms of men and fire-porver were far grcatcr War
rn former Yugoslalea, Somaha and Harti and the
Rrvanda cnsis put great pressurc on European
countries' armed forces, sent to take paft rn
operatrons under Uruted Nations ausplccs or tn
natronal operations such as operatron "Turquolse"
m the case of France, in relatrvely drstant lands
uhere the interests at stake werc somc\\'hat ill-
defined Economrc constramts are rmposrng uhat
often amount to drfficult chorces. partrcularly for the
ll. "At the requcst of an1' of the Hrgh Contracting
Parties the Councrl shall be rmmediatelv convened in
ordcr to pcrmlt them to consult urth regard to an1'
situation u'hrch mal' constltute a threat to peace. in
rvhatcvcr arca thrs threat should arise. or a danger to
economrc stabrlrtl"-
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larger countnes, betlveen mamtammg defence
arrangements that rlould allou them to cope urth a
major confrontation endangenng therr tcmtonal
mtegng'and an altematrve svstcm enabhng them to
intervene for shorter or longer penods m conflrcts
bevond therr bordersl2.
19. Thrs form of rntervention is possrble onlv rf
thc armed forces have proJectlon and rntervcntron
capabrlrtres that are surted to the tenarr, such as
tactrcal and strategrc lfi. hrghly'-traured and mobrle
mrlrtan'uruts urth a large volunteer component and
modem rntclhgence svstems in the form of satellrtes.
arrcraft and droncs The ever more costlv arral' of
equrpment s bevond the means of any one countn'.
uhrch has the beneficral effect of promotrng
bilateral and multrnatronal cooperatron. cven though
tlls also presents drsadvantages rn that the parbrers
have drfferent requlremcnts, u'hrch stcm from their
vanous natronal vle\vs on defence. not to mentron
budget constramts. as thc Eurofightcr 2000. FLA
and Hehos 2 programmes all go to shou' Some
countnes. such as Belgrum. Francc and Portugal,
have made drastic chorces The first tu'o have
dccided to abohsh conscnptron and thc thrrd to cut
dosn the penod of compulson' mrlitan' seruce to
four months. urth the emphass m all three cascs
berng placed on the need for the armed scr!'lccs
ultrmatelv to be made up entirelv of volunteers. as m
thc Umted Krngdom or the Unted States Austentv
drctatcs that harduare requlrements be met urth
mcreasmg frequcncv tluough rntemational coopcr-
atron. m parallel ruth defence-rndustry restructunng
around a small core of ma.1or rndustnal groups
specnhsrng m specrfic fields such as aeronautlcs,
mrssrlcs or spacc.
20. The formatron of multrnailonal uruts rs to
some ertent part of tlus streamhmng proccss m the
drive to aclucvc efficrencv urth reduced resources.
makrng rt possiblc for rndnrdual countnes to pool
them m such a \\'a)' as to avord ueakcrung the
defoncc strucfures rn ufuch vanous statcs are
rnvolved urtlun the frameq'ork of thc Atlantrc
Alhance and of WEU The Europcan Corps
cprtomrses tlus form of orgamsatron. as do Eurofor
and Euromarfor. the Anglo-Dutch amplubtous force
and thc ccntral multmatronal di'i,rsron. all of uhrch
uruts form part of uhat are knoxn as the forces
ansucrablc to WEU (FAWELDI3 These rmtiatrves
12 For cxamplc. Bntrsh. Belgran and French
mrlrtarl' unrts have been operatrng ln or around the
terrlton'of formcr Yugoslavra srnce 199l-92.
13 These forces arc also avarlablc to NATO.
have snolvballed, spreadrng rnto central Europe, as
the example of the Baltrc battalion serves to
illustrate, and expenence garned ur the past and strll
to come contnbutes to the success of NATO's
Parfirershrp for Peace programme and also. most
ccrtanly, to the smooth runnmg of the IFOR
missron rn Bosrua Indeed, present arrangements
mar,' foreshadorv the defence svstems of the next
centun'. u'hcre conr,'entronal armres, scaled doun to
therr optrmum slze on the basrs of the pnontrcs of
each statc, rvould be made up of unrts "t\\'inned" for
lornt urtcrventron urth those of other countnes, and
uould encompass. rf not all, at least some of the
membcrs of WEU and NATO. wrthout detnment to
the cohesron of the lvholc.
2l Tlus rncrcasmg urterpenetration and
rnterdependence of natronal armed forces does not
houever rmpl1, anv loss of control on the part of
national authontres. These remam central to the
decisron-makrng process srnce thel' alone are
responsrble to their natronal parhaments and therr
citizenn'for all forms of mrlrtan'deplorment Tlus
rs a most important pornt llluch needs to be
hghlighted as an]' attempt to create an armv to
defend Europe rs doomed to farlure as long as
certarn countnes. and among them some of the
largest. are not prepared to hand o'v'er the command
of therr armed forces to extemal authontres. be they
rntcrgovcmmental or Commurutv authontres (ur the
scnse of the European Umon) Nuclear \ 
€apons
are an evcn morc sensltlve area Their use cannot
be contemplated other than as a last resort u,hen
temtonal mtegnh' rs under senous threat. These
are the realrtres that have to be taken rnto account rn
burldurg a credrble collectrvc European secuntv and
defence svstcm. n'hrle safeguardrng the porver of
decrsron of each mcmbcr statc
22. At the same time. those countncs that u'rsh
should be able to make defcncc arrangements.
intcgrated to a greater or lesser e$ent as bcfits thcrr
intercsts 
- 
a European defence a la corte u'luch all
statcs can jorn and u'llch allous them thc nccessan'
flexrbilrtv to mamtam an adequate mrlrtarl'
capabrhS' at a trme u'hen budgets. staff and
cqurpments are constantlr'berng cut back. Anglo-
French cooperatlon betn'een air forces and on
nuclcar submanne patrols. and the creation of a
Benelur 
.1omt arrbome mtervention forcela are
recent developmcnts that rllustrate the trend towards
structures urth vary-urg degrees of integration. and
t2
11.-l,tlanttc 
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the resolve and need to act together to compensatc
for thc rnadequacies of rndvrdual countnes takcn in
isolatron At the same trmc it is essentnl that the
pohtrcal will is there to support such mrtratrves. as
they' urll othemise farl to move beyond therr
expenmental stage or else lrrll remarn linuted rn
their practical scope The European Corys and
Euromarfor have boen declared opcratronal.
although none of the govemments inl'olvcd has to
date made a clear statcment as to therr real use, for
example rr the contcxt of a post-IFOR operation rn
Bosrua.
23. The rntergovemmental nature of WEU.
rvhere no one country ls in a posltlon to impose
choices on other members, could allorv the
Orgamsatron to plav a leadrng role m coordrnatrng
mrtiatrves for brlateral and multilateral cooperatron.
prolrded the urshes of all mcmbcrs, as to whether
or not to participate m lomt arrangements wlth
varyrng degrees of mtegrailon, are taken mto
account, without this hox'ever holdmg up the entre
process Tlls u'ould avoid a situatron m ufuch
some govemments felt obhged to set up parallel
structures rndependentll'. rncludrng arrangcmcnts
for equrpment, even though the modified Brussels
Treat_v presents no obstacle to the devclopment of
tlus tlpe of irutiatrve and WEAG's 3ob rs to deal
*rth armaments-relatcd matters As far as WEU's
role is concemed. the governments must express
their polrtical urll clearll, and unambiguousll',
avoidrng chches hke "defence component of the
European Uruon and means to strcngthen the
European prllar of the Alliancel5" Othemse WEU
uill remarn on the sidellnes of the debate on
Europe's defence and its place rn the world. u'hrch rs
berng conducted essentially wrthin the European
Uruon and NATO, and wrll end up by berng
rndrsturgurshable from thc plcthora of organisations
and regronal ultiatives, lrrth or xithout proper legal
standrng, that deal drrectly' or indrrectll' ruth such
questrons
(b) The searchfor a coherent
E ur op ean sec u rity sy sl em.
24. The profusion m Europe of rnstrtutrons for
polrtrcal and secuntl'cooperation can be regarded
as an advantage m that it allows for permanent
dralogue at all levels between the countries of that
contrnent, u'luch to a degree acts to defuse cnses
15.Birmingham Declaration. paragraph 2; WEU
Council of Mrnrsters, Birmingham on 7 Ma1' 1996
and enables progress to be made rn drsputes
behveen drfferent states. Nevertheless it can also be
s\nonlmous uith a confusron of roles. fragmcn-
tatron of human and matenal resources and can
even brrng to the surface a sprnt of nvalry bctu'ecn
mstrfutrons. utuch. far from bnngrng orgamsatrons
and states closer togethcr. bccomes a sourcc of
drvrsron. Therc rs a nccd. therefore. to clanfi' the
situatron rf Europc is to be able to assurne
responsibihq' for rts rnterests in the u'orld rn
cooperatlon w-rth rts par0rers and alhes on other
contments. rvrthout bcurg lulnerable to extemal
pressure. Wrth regard to secuntl', rt is clear that
only four instrtutrons are, and urll conturue to be,
centre-stage. namcly NATO. WEU. the European
Umon and thc OSCE. Our oun Orgarusatron
occuples an mtermediary position behveen thc
Alhance and the Uruon but has not yet clearlv
defined rts optrons in relatron to the OSCE, u'luch 
-
there is no doubt 
- 
lacks porverful enough means to
be much morc than an electrons and human nghts
monitor. a Council of Europe role that goes back
manv vcars, even prcdatrrg the collapse of the
Berlur Wall
25. ln fact, it is around the European Uruon and
NATO that the debatc on future European sccuritv
and defence structurcs r.rrll revolve. rcgardlcss of
thosc rvho advocatc all numner of regional
rutratives but u'ho. themselves lackrng the means
and political commitnent. llrll end up leavrng the
field clear for the tg'o mstrtutrons referred to.
Norvadal's, r,rrtuallv all European countries have
tres wrth them and many aspire to full memberslup,
although the expression of that ursh rs at trmes
hedged about b1' qualifications and reseryatrons
mth regard to ther arms and mode of operatron
Tu'o factors arc basrcallv responsrblc for tlus thc
United Statcs' presence rr and commrtrnent to thc
Atlantrc Alhance, and the economic po\\'er rcp-
resentcd b1'thc European Uruon 
- 
in other rvords
the political, nulitary and cconomic secunh' that
flou's from memberstup of the two orgarxsatlons.
even though fi rs not alu'a1's easy for states to meet
the obhgatrons, partrcularlr the financial commit-
mcnts, that rt imphcs WEU for its part inll,
hopcfully ur the near rathcr than drstant future. be
requrred to define its role rn specrfic terms ur
relation to its tlvo "elder sister" orgamsatrons wrth
ufuch rt rs alreadf inexlncabll'lurked.
I WEU and the European Unron
26. "WEU u.rll be developed as the defence
component of thc European Uruon and as a mcans
l3
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to strengthen the European prllar of the Atlantic
Alhance" Thrs statement appears rn the Dec-
laralon by WEU member states on the role of
Wcstem European Uruon and its rclatrons urth the
European Uruon and thc Atlantrc Ailiancc, adopted
at Maastncht rn 1991. and rs ntually rntoned rn
even' declaraflon bv the Council of Mrmsters It
srrilnanscs, albert not urthout ambrguih'. the
drlcmma the Orgarusation is facrng todav rn relation
to the reforms bemg made rn the othcr hvo
rrstrtutions Although dcfirute progress has bcen or
rc on the u.av to bemg achreved m terms of relations
rrrth NATO. no consensus has as 1'et emerged. urth
regard to thc Uruon. as to the course WEU is to take
m ordcr to carry out thc role of "defence
componcnt" The ssue rs a sensrtrve one as rt
bnngs to the fore the pohcres of rndnrdual
govemments tou'ards the European Uruon itself,
and each onc's r-lcrvs of the futurc rn store for
polrtrcal cooperatlon m Europe and the Uruon's
place rn the u'orld
27 The legal basrs of the Europcan Union's
rcmrt for secuntv and. rndrrecth'. for defcncc rs laid
doun n Artrcle J 4 of the Maastncht Treah,, the
first tu'o paragraphs of u'luch state:
" I The common forergn and secuntr'
pohcl'shall urclude all questrons related
to the secuntv of the Uruon. rncludrng
the eventual franung of a common
defence pohq'u'luch rrught rr trme lead
to a common defencc
2. Thc Uruon requcsts the Westcm
European Uruon (WELI), ufuch is an
Lntegral part of the development of the
Uruon. to elaborate and implement
dccrsrons and actions of the Uruon
ufuch have defence rmphcations. The
Councrl shall. rr agreement urth the
mstrtutrons of the WEU. adopt the
necessan' practrcal arrangements".
28 Apphcatron of tlus texl, cited rn the
Maastncht Declarabon by the membcr states of
WEU and effective from I Januan' 1993. has
proved drfficult. maur.l1' on account of govcmments'
drffcnng vre\\'s over thc contcnt of the comrnon
forergn and secuntv pohcl- (CFSP) Denmark's
refusal to subscnbe to the secunq' and defence
provisrons of Artrcle J 4 and the accessron in 1995
of three countnes u-hosc pohcres rn the regard had
evolved outsrdc thc frameu'ork of NATO or WEU
membershrp havc markedlv comphcatcd rmplemen-
tatron of the CFSP as t was enr,rsagcd rn l99l
Even no\.r', rn spite of the efforts of certarn EU
member states, the Uruon's forergrr pohcl' erther
finds expressron rn officral statements that
supposedly present a corrrmon positron adopted by,
the Frfteen in response to events occumng rn
vanous parts of the rvorld or translates mto
econorrrlc assistance and cooperation, wfuch are
nonetheless an rnportant form of leverage ln one
or trvo mstances, for example former Yugosla.vra
and the Mrddle East, the Uruon has endeavoured to
take on a more polrtical role, ln assuilng
responsrbrhh' for the admuustration of Mostar rn
cooperation wrth WEU, or b1, appourtrrg a
European "mediator" rr order to be more activell'
rrvolved rn negotiations betw'een Israel and the
Palestrman Authontl,, but its maJor contnbution rs
strll an economrc one
29 The mtergovemmental conference is meant to
grve the CFSP rts second political urnd, but there is
no denfing the fact that progress to date has been
mimrnal. The rntroductron of the srnglc currenc)'
(the curo), u-hrch is absorbrrg the attentron and
energres of most European Uruon and WEU
member states, and the ssue of EU enlargement to
rnclude Cyprus, then the central European
countnes, have pushed drscussion of the common
foreign and secunq'pohcv mto the background To
these factors mrght be added the drfferences that
have tradrtionallv exsted betu'een some states over
the European Uruon's role m the rvorld 
- 
a mere
club for promotmg the market economv or zur
rrtegrated econormc and politrcal system. Relatrons
lrrth WEU, uhich, srrce the Maastncht Treah, u'as
signed. rs supposed to "elaborate and rmplement
decisions and actions of the Uruon wfuch have
defence imphcatrons" reflect the ncrssrtudes of the
prcvarlmg situatron urtlun the Uruon and are
suffenng as a result of the drffering membershtps of
the trvo orgarusations. Polrtical clanficailon rs
called for ln thrs connectlon before further
accesslons under consrderatron have the effect of
compoundrng the shlemate both organisatons have
reached
30 At the trme of srgnature of the Maastncht
Treaty', only' three signatory,' states, Denmark,
Greecc and Ireland. \\€re not WEU members.
Denmark. a member of NATO, posed no problem
as far as development of cooperation between WEU
and the Unon m secunt_v and dcfence matters ltas
concerned: Greece, for its parl, rvas shortlv to
bccome a member of WEU. and Ireland. alou'edll'
ncutral uith regard to the mrlrtan' alhances, srgred
l.t
DOCLII\4ENT 1518
and ratified the Trea[, ur rts entrrety. Deadlock over
the apphcation of Article J 4 2 set rn with the
accesslon of Austna, Furland and Srveden, as none
of these countries, all NATO non-members, openh'
expressed an1' desire to lorn WEU. There were one
or tw'o political declarations from Austna and
Fnland, uhich were not follou'ed up by an official
approach, the only one that ur fact cames any
weight Their observer status prolrdes no solution
to the drlemma over rmplementing the pror.rsions of
Article J.4, sl:rce rr practical terms t would amount
to non-members urstructrng an orgarusatlon ln
respect of u,tuch they' had no legal rights or
obhgations Moreover. drfficultres would almost
certa:nly arise over establislung rrulrtary cooperation
wrth NATO 
- 
already' embodred ur pnncrple rr
Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty16 and the
ven, aspect that constitutes a maJor stumbltng block
to convergurce betu'een WEU and the European
Uruon.
31. It is in fact the actual rvorth of the WEU
secunty guarantee that is thus called tnto questron.
Because of an overlap rr the membershrp of WEU
and NATO, any major aggression agarnst a WEU
member would, m pnnctple, activate the NATO
secunty guarantee, rn other rrords the practrcal
enactnent of the Uruted States' corffrxtment to
Europe's defence. Thts ts the crucral elcment tn the
guarantee mechamsm, which would probably not be
able to function rn the same way if countnes that
were not members of the Allian@ \ 'crg admrtted to
our owrr Orgarusatron Factors such as these must
be taken urto consideration before an1' commrtnent
ls made rr terms of WEU movulg towards
rntegration with the European Uruon because it is
patently clear that no European state is in a posthon
to assume the United States' role and responsibilities
in defendrng the contment. When rntegration takes
place, it must be the expression of the shared
polrtrcal resolve of WEU and European Uruon
member states, and be followed not by a solemn
declaratron but b1' a specific commrtnent to set up
European defence arrangements, commensurate tn
16 "In the execution of the Treatl'. the High
Contracting Parties and any organs establtshed by
them under the Treaty shall work ln close
cooperation u'ith the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisatron Recognisrng thc undesirabrlity of
duplicating the mrlrtarl' staffs of NATO, the Councrl
and its Agency [for the Control of Armaments] u'tll
rely on the appropriate military authortttes of NATO
for rnformation and advice on military matters."
financial and rndustnal terms wrth those of our
transatlantrc ally
32. Tlus is not ln any sensc an argument agamst
ntegration. but rather an analvsts nfuch ts csscnttal
for takrng fonvard the ongourg debate in WEU and
the Uruon on the relations that should exst bchvcen
them. A secuntl' and defence polio' rs not burlt
around declarations uhrch ma1'or mav not produce
effects, rt has to be the outcome of dar-todav effort
over the medrum and longer term. utuch rcqures a
financral conurutnent and unqualified support from
all states pag-to the process. If tlls last condrtion
rs not met, any attempt to transform WEU into an
nstrument of European Uruon forergn pohc-"- urll
cause polrtical tensions to emerge m relattons with
the Uruted States and NATO That u'ould also
can-r' the nsk of the drsappearance of our o\\n
Orgarusatron as uur rrdependent body, noturth-
standrng the fact that WEU ts alone capable of
embodyrng the European sccuntv and defonce
identrty r+rthrn the Alhance. and uould also be
tantamount to strengthemng Uruted States rnflucncc
over Europe's defence. Politically, tt ts essentnl to
approach the relationslup betw'ecn the trvo European
mstltutlons urth cautron. avordrng half-measures
that rrught damage thc coherence of European
secunt), structures.
33. The stottts quo s no longer acceptable but
reform and adlustnent to the nerv u'orld geo-
strategic order also demand extenstvc mobilisation
of resources, espccialll' m terms of budgets. together
wrth a strong polrtrcal commrtrnent Thrs makes
some states hesitant about any change rr the
exstrng positron, w'here costs and the exlent of an1'
commrtnents are knoun and can be controlled
Therefore it is natural enough that WEU member
states find themselves &uded as to the course
relations wth the European Umon should take. as ts
clear from the Orgarusatlon's contnbutton to the
urtergovemmental confercnce In that documcntrT.
three optrons are sfudred urthout arv one actuallv
berng chosen.
reffirced parulerslup between WEU and
the European Uruon. thus preserr.rng the
autonomv of the Orgarusatton and its
Trean,'t,
17. WEU contnbution to the Europcan Unron inter-
governmental conference of 1996. WEU Counctl of
Mrnrsters, Madrid. l;l November 1995
l8.Idem. II A
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rnstrtutronal convergence accordrng to anv
one of three possrbilitiesr" (r) a polittcal
commrtmcnt from WEU stressmg its
readmess to follou' Europcan Councrl
gurdehnes on dcfence mattcrs. (rt) WEU
u'ould be polrticalll' and opcratronallv
subordrnatc to the EU. although thrs
u'ould not entarl an1' jundlcal commtt-
ment, and u'ould regard rtself as a bod1,
urth a remrt to rmplement EU dccrsrons.
fttr) \t/EU xould commrt itself. through a
lcgallv brndrng agrccment. to elaborate
and rmplement dccrsrons and actrons ruth
dcfsnce rmplicatrons u'luch mav bc
entrusted to it bv the Unron.
urtegralon of WEU rnto the EU and the
drsappearance of the modrfied Brussels
Treatr'. this uould mcan that WEU
rvould also ccase to cxrst as an
rntematronal orgarusationlo
34 This thrrd optron. ufuch has the support,
albert ruth reservations about the arrangements and
trme-frame rnvolved. of a malontr,' of WEU and
European Umon membcr states. can be cnusaged
onlv rn the medrum and longer term. but beforc rt
can happen. the mtergovcmmental confercnce has to
amve at a broad defirutron of a credrble Europcan
secuntv and defence pohcl', one that is erther
accepted bv all members or developed uithrn a
frameuork of strengthened cooperatron betu'ecn
some countnes, as tn the case of monetary uruon
At the present stage m the drscussrons. there are no
definitc proposals and Uruon enlargcment to rnclude
C1prus. folloucd b1' certarn central European
countnes. also has to be taken mto account, further
comphcatrng the debate. Logrcallr,, transatlantlc
rclatrons ought to be redefined on thc basrs of a
drrect relationshrp bcrng formed behveen NATO
and the European Union2r but thrs ri'ould be bound
to create tenslons lrrth some European countnes
that are members of thc Alliance but do not yet
belong to the Uruon Moreovcr. affirmation of the
pnncrplc of collectivc defence ur a future Treatr,' on
Europcan Uruon must not duphcate obligatrons
alreadv entered into uithrn NATO as thrs u'ould
lead to conflrctrng commrtnents. It rs rmportant,
thcrefore. for WEU and European Uruon member
statcs to retarn their freedom of chorce as to rvhcthcr
19 Idem. II B
20 Idem II C
2l.Idem. II C I.
or not to jorn a collectrve defence for as long as
there rs no estabhshcd fiamework for EU/Alhance
relatrons. At the samc time. thought should be grven
to the effects of intcgratron on other secunh'
structures coexstrng rn Europe.
2. The role of the OSCE
35. Srnce the end of the cold u'ar. Europe's
instrtutrons have groun m slze and number as ncver
beforc. It became necessar]' to fill the pohtrcal
vacuum rn ccntral and eastem Europe that arose as
a result of thc drssolutron of the Warsaw Pact and
the break-up of the Sor,ret Uruon. At the same trmc.
organisatrons for political and economrc cooperatlon
bnngrng together the countnes of u'estem Europe or
spanning Europe as a nhole rmtrated a process of
rcform and enlargement that also led them to
consrder secunh'and defence matters. often wrthout
thcrr halrng an1' legal basis for dorng so Almost
ten vears later, regronal rmtiatives, some of u'tuch
u'crc mtended to be pror.rsronal, have become an
essential part of thc conturental polrtrcal scene and
plal' an rmportant role m promotmg polrtical
stabillt)'and reducrng tenslons m central and eastem
Europe Nevertheless, t has to be acknou'ledged
that some degree of ratronalisation is essentral,
especralll' m terms of secuntl, and defence, rf a
fragmentatron of resourccs and rnstrtutronal
paralysrs occasioned b1' so many decisron-makrng
centres are to be avorded At the same time, as
states gradualll' loin thc European Union and
NATO, such mrtiatrvcs are lkelv to decrease ur
number. as rn rnan), cases therr purpose is precrsely
to prepare therr members for accessron to those trvo
orgarusations under optmum condttrons.
36 Some regronal orgalusations operate urthm
thc European Uruon. an example berng the Benelux
Commrttee of Mrmstcrs, wfule others bnng together
Uruon members and non-members ahke. such as the
Nordrc Council. thc Council of Baltrc Sea States,
the Central European Irutratrve and the Black Sea
Economrc Cooperailon The Euro-Mediterranean
Conforcncc held in November 1995 mrght also one
da1' follou' the same pattem of development as the
OSCE wrth the creatlon of a "Councrl of
Medrterrancan States", a possrbrhh' suggestcd rr a
report b1' the Forergr Affarrs Commrttee of the
French Natronal Assemblr,22 Ttus profusron of
institutions for regronal cooperation makes an
22 France and the Mediterranean. ne!r' challenges.
page 39 of rnformation report No. 2373. Rapporteur,
Mr Jacques Ml'ard, 16 November 1995.
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important contnbution to the stabrhh' of the
contment bv encouragrng dialogue between states at
all levels, but such cooperation refers essentrallv to
general, economrc or environmental pohcl' rssues
and rarell' !'entures rnto the realms of secunty and
defence. Here, progress is slorver and the chmate of
mrstrust inhcnted from the cold rvar penod or
earlier conflicts has not been entrrell, drspelled.
There is also the fact that urthm a partrcular
organisatron some states mav have drfferenccs wrth
one another that hmder the effectiveness of its u'ork
as a u'hole
37 [nthe secunty field, the paradoxrcal nature of
tlus srtuatron is best illustrated rn thc OSCE lvhere.
on the one hand, states seek to create framervorks
for coopcration and dralogue but. on the other. farl
for polrtrcal and economrc reasons to prolrde the
resourccs neccssan' for actlevurg the objectrves
thel' themselves have set. Created rn 1994. the
orgarusatron u'as the outcome of the process
rrvolr.rng the senes of Conferences on Secun$' and
Cooperation rn Europe. irutiatcd n 1972 Todar'. it
plal's an mpoftant role ur the debatc on secunff
structures rn Europc and rts membersh-rp has the
advantage of compnsrng almost all thc states of the
contment m addrtron to the Uruted Statcs and
Canada. Nevertheless, it has to be acknouledged
that. givcn the lack of resources for rts
implementation, the success of its u'ork rs largell'
due to the goodrvrll of its member states and therern
hcs rts grcatest u'ealmess
38. The document on "European Sccun[' a
common concept of the 27 WEU countrics" statcs
that "the OSCE . pla1,s a fundamental role rn
creatrng an endunng cooperative secunty space m
Europe ..." and pomts out that "WEU has offered to
support. on a case-bv-case basis and rn accordance
uith rts oun procedures. conflict preventron and
crisis-management measures undertakcn under the
OSCE aegrs WEU should nou' enr.rsage u'hat
expertlse or logrstrcal and personnel contributions
could be madc avarlable for OSCE actrr.rties rn tlus
ficld:t" Tlus rs an mportant commrtment but one
uhose practrcal consequences uill not rmmedrately
be usible, smce m realrtl,WEU does not vet hal'e
the appropnate mrlrtarl' means to take over from
NATO rn Europe and meet a request for assrstance
from the OSCE. or rndecd the Uruted Nations
Moreover, nerther the Birmrngham Declarauon of 7
May, nor the annual report of thc Councrl for the
23.European Securiq': a common concept of the 27
WEU countries. Madrid. 14 Novcmber 1995.
period I Julv to 31 Dccember 1995, rr ufuch the
OSCE rs not even mentroned once. appear to
confirm that cooperatron urth tlus orgarusation is a
matter of pnonfi'.
39. Tlus rs, houever, an area in u'llch WEU can
plal'a leadrng role, surcc the OSCE needs mrhtary
cover m order to carr)' out rts tasks. Account must
also be taken of the fact that wrthm that
orgamsatron decrsrons are taken unanimously',
rmpll,rng the agreement of states rihrch nught rvell
themselves be on the recelvmg end of an OSCE
mrssion. To date, in the abscnce of the appropriate
mcans. such opcratrons have mct rrith varyrng
success, particularly' so m the casc of the clecfions
m Bosrua and Herzegovrna. uhich u'ere certified
despite the irregulantres observed:o and the fact that
thel' confirmed a de 
-facto partition. The presence of
the Uruted States and the Russran Federatron wrthrn
the OSCE and the urfluence they have rn that
orgarusatron are not unconnected wrth the
certificatron decrsron, smce the Uruted States needed
to ensure that thc Davton Accords were
rmplemented as plarured and Russia uas rntent on
secunng the liftrng of the Uruted Natrons embargo
agamst former Yugoslaua. As rt had no pohce
force or rrulrtary mezurs to ensure that voters had
real freedom of movement and that the electoral
campaign rvas conducted properll', the OSCE had
no optron other than to vahdate the results.
Srmrlarll,. ur Chechnya, it could do no morc than
record vrolations of human nghts and of the man),
ccase-fires agreed betlveen both partres to the
conflrct
40. All thrs exporience u'ould suggest that rf the
OSCE rs to maurtaur rts credrbili['. rt urgently needs
to be able to call on a mrlrtan' force uhich could
only be that of WEU if the latter had every freedom
to takc actron as part of a rrusslon entrusted to rt b1'
the OSCE. In addrtron. the Russran Federatron u-rll
not agrce to NATO berng askcd to rntervene, on
behalf of the OSCE, ur thc tcmtorl' of the CIS.
Moreover. the area rn u'hrch thc OSCE rs l*cl1'to
be required to rnten'enc rs not Belgium or Spaur but
central Europc. the Balkans. the CIS and the
Caucasus. regions bnngrng WEU. NATO,
European Uruon and other countnes rnto contact
urth the Russian Fcderatron Recourse to WEU. so
2.l Accordrng to Robert Frourck. u'ho u'as in charge
of the OSCE mission oversccing electrons rn Bosnia.
the results u'ere rmperfect and debatable but on the
whole acceptable, Ilullettn liurope No 6822. page 3,
30 September-l October 1996.
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long as it marntaurs its rndependence of NATO,
entarls feu'er polrtrcal drsadvantages for the OSCE
and would pror,rde rt with the mears it needs to
rmplement rts own decrsrons. But ttus optlon can
onl)' be contemplated rf WEU develops rts
operational capabilities and actualll' commrts rtself
to uorkrng alongside the OSCE, for example by
means of a protocol on cooperatron. creatrng a tre
behl'een the tu'o orgarusations and specrf),mg the
procedures to be follorved for provrding assrstance
Farling thrs, there lvill be no progress belond
political declarations that do not produce anv
practrcal effect, and NATO wrll once agaur be able
to pornt to the lack of coherence ur European
securitv and defence thurkrng that comes to hght as
soon as the Uruted States no longer has the upper
hand.
III. The developmcnt of NATO
and thefuture of WEU
4l Notwrthstandrng speeches and declaratrons
about the role of WEU, the progress it has made rr
terms of its operatronal capabrlrtl, and rts contn-
bution to Europe's defence, there rs no denyrng that
secuntl' and defence matters contrnue for the most
part to be dealt uith rn NATO. Tlus manil'has to
do xrth resources and polrtrcal urll as embodred b1,
the Uruted States, wrth rts domrnant role rn the
Alliance, smce other countnes have not y,et managed
to reconcrlc therr drffenng perceptlons and form a
genurne European platform u'rthrn the Alhance. ur
the shape of WEU WEU must unequivocally'
ztssume the mantle of the European secuntv and
defence identity called for n the North Atlantic
Councrl Declarations25. In order to do so, the CJTF
conc€pt must be rmplemented urthin a reasonable
penod, and tlxs u: tum rnplies politrcal cooperatron
betrveen the t$'o orgarusations at the hrghest level so
as to avoid stalemate The bcst rvay xould be for
Denmark, Iceland. Nom'ay'and Turkel', utuch have
observcr or assocnte member status. to be more
closell' rnvolved m the u'ork of WEU and that of all
its bodres
42. At the same tme it is obraous that the
enlargement of NATO to rnclude central European
countnes wrll change the position of some of the
WEU associate partrers The practical effect of
enlargement rull bc a degree of confusion since a
central European countn'uill be able, for example.
25 Frnal communique of the North Atlantic Councrl,
paragraph 7. Berlin. 3 June 1996.
to contnbute withrn NATO to the secuntv and
collective defence of Europe ur a transatlantic
framework, u'lule Europe itself. as represented by
WEU and the European Uruon, wrll not guarantee
that partrcular state's secunty. Ttus can onll'
rncrease the influence the Uruted States alread'
exerts upon exrstmg secun|'and defence structures
both drrectly', through NATO, and rrdrrectlv by
makrng the latter's human and logrstrcal resources
available to WEU. To be free of such paradoxes,
WEU and the European Uruon must make a major
politrcal effort to clarif, these rssues. w'luch can
perhaps be solved by coordrnated enlargement of the
Alliance, thc Uruon and our own Orgamsatlon, on
the basis of arrangements and trme schedules that
could be drfferent. Secunty rn Europe must
encompass all ts countnes ln a long-term
perspecfive and not be crafted to surt the short-term
urterests of some largcr countries, at the nsk of
recreaturg past drnsions and areas of polrtrcal and
econonuc influence that nught bc the cause ofnerv
conflrcts
(a) Reform and enlargement of NATO
43 The Atlantrc Alhance ls goulg through a
period that is crucral for rts future and the decisions
to be taken rn the coming months rcprcsent a
qualitative advancc of malor srgruficance for the
future European secunt_v and defence arctutecture.
NATO rn 1996 exemphfies a transrtron from the
structures that emerged from the cold war and from
contarned confrontatron behveen the tno
supcrpo\\€rs to a nerv configuration better adapted
to the neu,geostrategrc situatron ur Europe and the
u'orld at largc The cnsis m former Yugoslalia
gave rt an opporturu[- to demonstrate that rt can
exerclso its nulrtarl'pro\\'ess on condrtion that it has
the firm polrtrcal resolve of governments behrnd it
and that their oblectrves arc clearly stated. The
success to datc of mrssrons assrgrred to IFOR and
rvork undertaken uithm the framew'ork of the
Parftrers]up for Peace are evidence of thc Alliance's
abihq'to deal wrth presentday challenges and thus
contnbutc to the polrtrcal stabilry' of thc contrnent.
At the samc trme it has embarked on a maJor reform
of military and politrcal structures u'tuch takes
account of the cuts m membcr states' defence
budgets and the rcstructunng of rntional defence
systems.
44 Enlargement to rnclude the countncs of
central Europe is, neverthelcss. an lrutntive uhose
outcome ls uncertam rn secunt),terms as t directlv
rnvolves relatrons between the Uruted States and the
l8
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Russian Federation, r,vhose exchanges of vrews are
at trmes remmrscent of the atnosphere during the
cold war. The European members of the Alhance,
uho are, on the whole, m favour of enlargement,
nonetheless have views about the condrtrons
govemrng the process. especrally w'hen it comes to
memberslup cntena and the choice of one countrl,
rather than another. The debate is a sensttrve and
complex one, wrth a somervhat secretive political
and economic agenda, but WEU must be involved
ur it, if only because the new members urll have
their own views on whether the CJTF should
urtervene rn support of the European Uruon or the
OSCE, m the context of European nulitary
operatrons not covered by the terms of Article V of
the modrfied Brussels Trea[, It is not for our
Orgarusatron to meddle rn the rntemal affairs of the
Alliance, but the interactron betu'een the trvo
organisations, recently enshnned rn a secunt)'
agreement26, demands at least a degree of mutual
coordrnatron, unless the rntention rs for WEU to
remain in the shadow of the Alliance uithout beng
able to fulfil its natural role as NATO's European
prllar.
l. Implementation of the CJTF concept
45. In January 1994. in Brussels, the North
Atlantic Councrl took the decision to allow
European members of the Alhance and WEU to
draw on NATO mrlrtary assets for operations not
covered by Artrcle 5 of the Washrngton Treaty. To
this end, specrfic strucfures u'ould be created,
known as combined jourt task forces (CJTF),
composed of "separable but not separate'r support
uruts2T made avarlable to WEU. However, it was
not until the Alhance's June 1996 summit meetrng rn
Bcrlin that any real progress was made rn apply'rng
the concept. srrce negotiations at political and
nulitary level farrly quickly' riul up agarnst a number
of obstacles. In actual fact, the Amencan concept
of the CJTF drd not correspond to that held by'
Europeans u'hen rt came to u'ho should have the
real politrcal and operational control over CJTF
operations. It should also be emphasised that the
United States created a precedent in the conduct of
NATOAMEU lornt operations rvhen, in 1995, the
Amencan govemment decrded, under pressure from
Congress, umlateralll, to wrthdrarv from lts
26 WEU Securrty Agreement. Bmssels, 28 March
I 995
27. North Atlantic Council, Declaratron of heads of
state and of government, paragraph 6; Brussels, l0-
11 January 199.1
mvolvement rn operatrons rr the Adnatic to monitor
the embargo imposed by the Uruted Nations on
former Yugoslaraa.
46. The problems over rmplementrng the CJTF
are also lrked ur part to the reform of NATO
command strucfures, an area of drsagreement
between the French and Amencanszs. In theory,
tr.lo maur scenarios are possrble
- 
the WEU Council can decide, in response
to a request from one or more member
states, to mobilise the CJTF to deal with a
cnsis ur the framework of its activities
under Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Trealv, or at the request of the
Uruted Nations orthe OSCE.
- 
the European Council, rr apphcation of
the common forergn and secunty policy,
can ask the WEU Councrl for mrlrtary
assistance in carrying out a Petersberg-
tlpe operation. The WEU Council
assents and insructs rts mrlitary bodies to
irutiate the actron. At the same trme it
contacts the North Atlantic Councrl to
obtarr from NATO the assets WEU does
not have such as airbome survetllance
and strategrc hft capabilities (AWACs
and C-17 aircraft for example) NATO
glves the go-ahead and the mtlitary
authontres make the nec€ssary alrange-
ments to supply WEU uith the required
assets.
Nevertheless two questrons remain unresolved. (y'
how to avoid a political stalemate ansrng from thc
fact any decision taken wrthrn NATO must be
unanrmous; (r) ttho has overall command of the
CJTF 
- 
WEU b1, itself or the NATO nulitary
structures, namely the supreme commander, lvho ts
an Amencan general?
47 From a polrtrcal porrt of r,rerv. the presence
of all the members of WEU rn the North Atlantrc
Council is a lrrnral guarantee that the mechanism
urll functron as descnbed It is drfficult to imagure
that a country rvould approve WEU undertakrng a
missron only to deny it access to NATO assets.
Hou'ever. thrngs become more comphcated rvhen
approval or positive abstention must be secured
from states with associate member or observer
l9
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status One such rs Turker', some of lvhose reccnt
pubhc statements shox,that rt rs genumely imtated
by'the European Uruon and WEU2'. rvtuch cannot
farl to have repercusslons on the rmplemcntatron of
the CJTF u'hen the trme comes for it. Consrderatron
of tlus matter camot be put off for much longer.
wrth NATO enlargcment soon to go ahead srth the
accesslon of no less that threc countnes u'hrch are
members of nerther the Europcan Uruon nor WEU
In the absence of an appropriate pohtrcal solution,
the CJTF are unlikclv to get fu(her than the general
planmng stage. Tlus rvould further accentuate
dependence on the Uruted States. ufuch would be
the onll' country able to get tlungs monng agarn
48 The Uruted States itself has I'et to clanfl, its
posrtion ur the matter, especrally urth regard to the
rssue of mrlrtarl' command, ufuch ralses US
domestrc pohcy'considerations. maurll, m terms of
relations betu'ccn Congress and thc Admrrustratron
Some WEU members, France foremost among
them. would prefer command of the CJTF to be
assrgrrcd m rts entrretv to a European gcneral, lr'ho
would be a deputt'to the Amencan SACEUR carrv
out tasks on behalf of WEU and NATO and
reprcscnt the European secuntv and defence rdentr['
wrth:n the Alliance As far as thc Uruted States is
concemed. tlus u'ould amount to a transfcr, albert
temporary', of comrnand over US equrpment and
numpo$'cr to European structures. In prurcrple, tlus
should be no more than a technrcalrtl'. rn hne wrth
the Admrrustratron's public advocacy' of Europe
hav.g more involvement rr rts oun defence and of
strengthemng the European component of NATO,
but rr realrtv thrs [pe of transfer rvould probably be
vetoed b1'thc Uruted States Congrcss3o, uluch has
alrcady on several occaslons openll' opposed the
idca of transfemng command over US assets to
outside bodrcs, the Uruted Nations first among
thcm
49 The solutron as far as the Amcncans are
concemed is to leave ultrmate control over NATO
assets wrth SACEU& urth the optron of
uithdraurng them should he ludge it appropnate or
if the operation's aims depart fiom those ongrnallv
set for t. so as to avord the sort of stuatron rr lvhich
I.INPROFOR found rtself trapped m former
Yugoslaraa, or [,NSOM's expenence rn Somaha.
Ttls is not acceptable to Europeans. rvho would
29 "Turks threaten to block NATO's eastern push",
The Independenr. l5 October 1996
30. "France $ants top NATO post for European";
Reuters u'orld report, 12 September 1996.
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thus be depnved of therr rrdependent porver of
decrsron and evaluation if the srtuation on thc
ground made rt nccessar)' to alter the nature of the
operation as enlrsaged at the outset, for example by
convcrtng a peacekeepurg mrssion mto a peace-
makmg operatron Nevertheless. WEU and
European Uruon members have lrttle room to
numoeuwe because of their almost total lack of the
logistrcal and sun'erllance capabilities necessan' for
a rnaJor operafion Tlus problem can onlv be
resolved through enhanced European moperatlon
over equlpment. lvluch rr practrcal terms means
strengtherung the remrt of the Westem European
Armaments Group (WEAG) and, ultrmatell',
creating a European Armaments Agencl'. as
foreshadolved b1' the FrancoCerman Agenc1,,
ufuch also cooperates urth other WEU member
states, such as the Uruted K:ngdom and the
Netherlands3r Wrthout a Jort fundrng cornmrtnent
to procure force prolectron (FLA project) and
surverllance mcans (satellites, aircraft and drones).
logrstrcal dependence on the Uruted States urll
srgruficantly restnct the scope of CJTF operalons.
50 In pnnciple. a solution must be for.rnd to
these problems at the forthcomrng mrnstenal
meetmgs WEU and NATO are to hold m November
and December of tlus y,ear". Thrs is esscntial rn
leeu'of thc fact that the IGC is to complete ils rvork
rn June 1997, precrsell'u-hen NATO is due to start
cnlargement proper From WEU's standpornt, the
CJTF concept obhges rt to strengthen its operational
capabilrtres and estabhsh a general consultatron
mechamsm cnablurg the Councrls of the hvo defence
alliances to deal u.rth an1' cnses m advance" The
success of the process is essential for the future of
Europe's defence, sincc rt has the 
"irrue ofpromoting Jomt cooperatron behveen NATO, WEU
and the European Uruon urthout duphcatrng
exrstmg Alliance structurcs or mvolving further
expendture on hardrvare at a ttme u'hen budgets arc
limrted and constraints associated urth the
introduction of a srngle currency are srgruficantlv
reducrrg the room for manoeuvre avarlable to
states Nevertheless, thrs is no excuse for WEU
member states not to grve detarled thought to the
nature of the relatronstup it should develop u,rth
31.-4tlanhc -\erys. No 284'7, 18 September 1996.
32 NATO/WEU/European security and dcfence
rdentitl': tou'ards a framework agreement next
December; artrcle in French rn Europe No. 6828,
pagc 4. 9 October 1996
33 Idem
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some of fts parftrers that wrll become members of
the Alliance rn the very near future
2. NATO enlargement a pohfical deason wtth
uncertam implrcations
51 Accession to NATO by some central
European countnes is the logical e(ension of the
Alliance's pohcv of cooperatron urth that region,
wluch has until now taken the form of the
Parhrershrp for Peace launched ur 1994. WEU, by
creatrng an assocrate partner status. and the
European Uruon. by developing the Europe
Agreements, have also shoun they' are takrng on
board the regron's secunt-v problems and economrc
drfficulties. IFOR's Bosrua operation served to
demonstrate the lnterest and relevance of the PfP
prograrnme, especially, in terms of future polrtrco-
mrlitarl, cooperatron between NATO and the
Russnn Federation. But such rnitiatives have not
for all that drastically changed the post-cold w'ar
European geostrategic slatus quo, srnce the
drsappearance of the Warsau' Pact and the Sovret
Uruon have not led to an), extensron of the NATO
TreatrJs temtonal application bevond its rnclusron
of a urufied Germany, and the Russnn Federatron
has fallen rn urth that positron although rt has
rnsisted on a specnl status ur its relatronshrp with
the Alhance Today the question of enlargement s
causrng concern, not only in Russn but also rn all
those other applicant countnes that are not being
rnl rted to.;orn rmmedrateh'.
52 These problems, ufuch are explored m some
detail rr another Pohtrcal Commrttrc reportto and
also rn a report from the AssemblyJs Defence
Committe€3-'. are once agarn linked in vanous ways
to Uruted States domestrc and forergn pohcl'.
urcludrng trade policv. In spite of thc drfficultres
their decision threatens to create rn terms of
relations wrth the Russian Federatron or lnth regard
to sfuatrons of rnstabrliry' that may anse, both
Congress and the Admrmstratron have commtted
themselves legally' and rn practrce to three or even
four central European states becomrng full members
of the Alliance bv 1999 at the latest. Thrs is onll'
the start 
- 
the long-terrn arn is for most of the
3.1. The eastern dimensron of European secunt\' 
-
Document 15.12; Rapporteur. Mr Antretter. 42nd
sessron of the Assembly of WEU;December 1996.
35.Defence and security rn an enlarged Europe 
-
reply to the annual report of the Council; Document
15.15. Rapporteur Mr Marten. -12nd session of the
Assemblv of WEU; December 1996
region's countnes to 1ou:. apart from the Russian
Federatron. Reaction from Europe has so far been
favourable but there has strll not been an1' real
debate, exccpt to express support for enlargement,
often with reseryatrons. In realitl', the Uruted States
has made a much firmer commrtrnent than its alhes,
as is clear from a recent speech Presrdent Clurton
made dunng hrs election campargn in Detroit on 22
October, rn wfuch he stated "B1' 1999 
- 
NATO's
50th anmversary and l0 1'ears after the fall of the
Berhn Wall 
- 
the first group of countnes we inlrte
tolour should be full-fledged members of NATO"36.
53. For its part, Congress adopted an act on 23
July 1996, the "NATO Enlargement Facrlrtation
Act of 1996" , setturg out the arms of enlargement ur
reasonable detail and urcludrng financral pronsions
to facrlrtate accesslon b,v central European
countries. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Repub-
hc are refened to as among the first to quahfl'
(Section 6: Designatron of countnes ehgible for
NATO enlargement assistance) and Albarua,
Bulgana, Estorua, LaMa. Lithuania, Moldova,
Romarua. Slovakia, Sloverua and {.Ikraure are
supposed to be urcluded rn subsequent "waves" of
admrssion, dependrng on therr polrtrcal and
economrc development (Section 4. Scnse of the
Congress regardrng further enlargement of NATO)
A sum of 60 million dollars has been earmarked to
prepare for the first accessrons, 20 mrlhon rr
subsidl' costs of drrect loans, 30 mrllion rn
assrstance on a grant basrs and l0 rrullion for the
mrlitary education and trauung of officers rn the first
three countnes This falls a long uay short of the
total cost of enlargement, u'luch runs to brlhons of
dollars over the shorter or longer term dependrng on
the number of countnes envrsaged. Accordrng to a
sfud1'by three Rand Corporatron rcsearchers, costs
could nse to ll0 brlhon dollars (marmum option)
over a period of l0 to 15 r'ears37, rvhrle accordrng to
the Congressronal budget office (CBO) it could
reach 125 brllion over l0 1'ears (urth the Uruted
States meeting some l0o% of costs)38.
54. ln a penod of lou'er defcnce budgets and
malor budget constraints for most of the European
countnes that are members of WEU and NATO.
and beanng rr mind thc relatrve precanousness of
central and eastcm European econorrues, the sums
mentioned in pro-enlargement officral or non-
govemmental documents should be l,rerned wrth
36 Internatronal Herald Tribune,23 October 1996
3'7. Fmancrul Tunes. 28 August 1996
38. Idem
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cautlon Ttus pcrhaps explams why, rf one leaves
asrde the rhetonc about stabrlrtf' and the extra
secunt)' garns to be had from enlargement, there
havc not yet been any parliamentarl' debatcs or
official reports ur European caprtals. Within the
Nliance rtself. the study on NATO enlargement
does not put a figure on an), of its estrmates; rt
srmply observes rr tlus connectlon that "when to
deal with budgetary and admrustrative ssues urll
need to be decrded"3'. Holever, the Uruted States
has urulaterallv fixed 1998-99 as the deadlure for at
least three countnes, rnpl)lng that such matters
must be drscussed and resolved br' 1997, if the
ratificatron process for accessions is to be
completed rn 1999. Ttus rs only'one of the contro-
versial aspects of the question, since the polrtrcal
problems rarsed by' selectmg only a few courtnes
and the rmphcations of those choices for relatrons
with Ukraine and the Russnn Federation urll also
have to be dealt uith.
55. The chorce of Hungary'. Poland and the
Czech Republic is based on the fact that rt is ur
those countnes that politrcal and economrc reforms
have made most progress They are also the first rr
lrre for accession to the European Uruon and rt ts
onll' logrcal that WEU rs hkely to come next on
their hst of preferences. Nevertheless, therr
geostrategrc positron is not such as to present
rmmedrate dangers that would justrfl' speedrng up
the process of enlargement. In contrast, there are
varlmg degrees of urstabihty rn the srtuations of the
Baltrc states, Albania. Romarua and Bulgana The
first group are pre.v to politrcal developments m the
Russnn Federatron whrle the second are affected bl
their location n the Balkans, on the borders of
Bosrua, uhere the srtuatron has temporanly become
more settled. The three Baltrc states rvould scem to
be in the most sensitrve positron, because, over and
above NATO relations, they b.rng mto plal'
relations betw'een the United States and the Russnn
Federation. Proposals have been made for
strengthemng the ParErership for Peace4, but the
heads of state of Lrthuarua, Estorua and LaMa. Mr
Brazauskas, Mr Men and Mr tllmanis, stated rn a
jonrt commuruque on 28 September 1996, that they
uere to rrtensify drplomatic efforts to obtarn
support for therr secunh' from all the relevant
countnes through NATO memberslup and brlateral
secunW arrangements lrith westem countnesal . In
39. Study on NATO enlargement, page
September 1995
10 Atlantrc i\/ews No 2853. .t October 1996
4l. Idem
36,
22
porrt of fact. their common border wrth Russia and
(rn the case of Estorua and LaMa) the presence on
their temtory of large Russian-speakrng commun-
tres serve partly to explarn the reluctance of
NATO. and especrally'the Umted States, to pronde
them uith a secuntv guarantee that also covers
nuclear aspects 
- 
a fact ufuch tends to be
overlooked
56. l]krarnc n in a srmrlar srtuation and rts
govemment has taken a very moderate lrre by
staturg that it does not oppose other countnes
Jouxng and, for the trme berng, choosrng not to
declare itself as an apphcant. It is somethrng of a
paradox that rn spite ofttus stance, Congress refers
to the country as being on the hst of future
candrdates r,''hen it comes to NATO enlargement,
rvluch wrll do nothrng to rnstil calm in discussions
wrth the Russian Federatron. Thrs is not preventrng
Ukrame from developmg contacts over secunty and
defence matters w,rth NATO and WEU, or uith its
neighbours rvho u'rll shortly be louung, as the recent
exerclse camed out rn that countr), in September
1996, rnvolvurg Bntish. Pohsh and llkrarman
forces, and the exrstence of a tnpartite military
cooperation agreement both go to shorv. The
srgnature of a lornt declaration u.rth the WEU
Secretary4eneral, on 20 September 1996, putting
relatrons betu'een Llkraure and our oun Organ-
sation on an officral footrrg, is rn lrre uith the
policy of proceedrng step b1' step ufuch. '*'lule it
does not provide the same level of secunW as
NATO membcrstup. does not seem to cause
tensions urth other states ln the regron. Wrthout
pou'erful milrtary assets, WEU is obvroush'not as
attractive a proposition as the Alliance but it does
have an rmportant role to play b1, coopcratlng
actrvely urth the central European countnes and
enablurg them to be more closely, mvolved rn its
actinties and the lvork of its vanous bodres, urthout
tlus grlrng nse to ob.;ectrons or the formation of
"grev areas".
(b) WEU after Berlin
57 NATO reform and enlargement w'ill have a
malor impact on the xorkrng and composition of
WEU. Implementatron of the CJTF concept means
that operational structures uill have to be
strengthened and the charn of command from
politicrans to the mrlrtary clearlv defined, a subject
uhich has scarcelv bsen touched upon rn Council
declaratrons and documents published to date. The
first operatron of this krnd urll be a decrsive tcst of
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the entire orgarusation's credrbrlrty, r.lhich perhaps
explams rvhy member states are rn no hurry to
concem themselves wrth rvhat happens when IFOR
pulls out, evcn though the Amencan authonties
have not commrtted themselves to maurtauung a
force on the ground and are withdraurng thetr
troops ufule pursurng their programme of helplng
the Mushm-Croat Federation to rearrn. Added to
this, there are difficulties of a political complexron
ansng from drsagreement between France and the
Uruted States over the Alliance commandso2, which
threatens to delay the establishment of a European
secunty and defence identrty whrch the North
Atlantic Council called for ur the Declaration it
adopted rn Berhn on 3 June 1996
58. The cost of enlargement threatens to absorb
resources ttnt nught be necessary for strengthenrng
operational asssts and structures The constratnts
resultrng from the preparattons being made for a
srngle currencv are sloumg dolrn some hardware
programmes m areas rvhere member states have
limited resources, such as arrhft and observatton
satelhtes. and are casting uncertarnty over anti-
mrssile defence prolccts at a trme when the number
of mrssile dehvery systems berrg developed outsrde
Europe rs on the increasea3. From a polrtical pornt of
vlew, there rs extreme uncertarnW as to the
conclusions the IGC wrll reach on secunty and
defence matters, no optlons harng yet been
formulated as regards the rnclusron of a secunty'
guarantee m the new Treaty on European Union,
wluch is bound to lead to a conflrct over areas of
responsrbrlrty with NATO and the Uruted States. or
even of the Petersberg mrssionsa. Faced wrth these
deadlures set by NATO and the European Uruon, it
is becomrng necessary for WEU, through tts
Council and in cooperatton urth the Assembly, to
make a balanced, practical and determrned
contnbutron to Europe's secunty, whrle contlnuurg
to strengthen rts capabrlrtres.
l. Development of operafional capahhties
59. Under the Portuguese and Spanish
Presidencies, WEU undertook a consultation
exercise, "European Secunty 
- 
a common concept
of lhe 27 WEU countnes", on the development of a
12.Ot 25 September 1996, AFP reported drfficulties
in progress towards the creation of a European ptllar
of the Alliance.
43. "Europe faces rising threat from global misstle
stock"; The Ttmes, l0 October 1996
41.Europe, No 6829, page 3; l0 October 1996.
European defence pohcy wluch has led, albeit rn a
modest rvay, to some practrcal achievements. The
Bntrsh Presidencl'drstngurshed rtself ur thrs field, in
sprte ofthe doubts sometimes rarsed by rts views on
European securitv and defence issues, as set out tn
the "Memorandum on the Umted K:ngdom Govern-
ment's approach to the treatnent of European
defence issues at the 1996 rntergovemmental
confsrence". The emphasis placed on the urter-
govemmental nature of the CFSP and WEU should
not be interpreted as an anti-Europe stance, ur other
words as hostile to urtegratrng the policies of WEU
and European Uruon member countries, but as an
acknowledgement of the realrty of the exstence of
nation states in Europe and an awareness of the fact
that untrl the states in the two organisations can
reach agreement on the arms of a European secunty
and defence policy and make a specific commrfinent
to prol,rde the assets requrred for rmplementrrg rt,
the maur effort will have to be made by states
themselves, either alone or rn bilateral or
multilateral frameworks
60. Hence, out of a concem for efficiency, the
British Presidency made strengthemng WEU's
operational capabilities. rn other words the militarl'
and rrtelhgence assets ufuch give t "politrco-
nulitary control of European operations"a5, its
pnon$'. An important step m ths drrection was
taken wrth the Cnsex exerclses wluch took place rr
1995 and 1996 and the setturg-up of a permanent
Srtuation Centre and an Intelligence Section lvrthrn
the Planmng Cell. In parallel, the Uruted Krngdom
took the decision "to makc its operatronal sea
trarring facilities avarlable for natronal or collective
use by WEU natrons"6 
- 
an uutiative of not
mconsiderable rmporlance since it spared WEU
from havrrg to make the mvestrnent required for
setturg up tlus tlpe of structure at a trme of budget
restnctrons across the board. ln another area, that
of force projection capabrlities, the Councrl reached
agreement on "a WEU concept for strateglc
mobrlrty to facilitate the conduct of Petersberg
missrons"47. Tlus package of practtcal measurcs is
helpurg strengthen WEU's hand rr its relations wrth
NATO and the European Uruon.
61. Nevertheless, ur what is essentially a political
sphere, the member states have strll not managed to
reconcile their drffenng viervs. Thcre is no doubt
45. WEU Counctl of Mtnisters, Birmrngham
Declaratron. point 2; Birmrngham. 1 May 1996.
46.Idem, pornt 5.
47.Idem. pomt 4.
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that strengthening nulrtarl' structures rntended for
use m operafions camed out by the CJTF, ufule
srgruficantly consohdating WEU's Ies urth NATO,
does not give the European Uruon any' real support,
tkough WEU, rn rmplementng CFSP decisions.
For as long as the issue of final control over the
CJTF remarns unresoll'ed and questrons conceflung
relatrons urth the other Europcan members of the
Alliance have not been settled. WEU urll not have
the necessan' autonomy to respond to a request
from the Uruon The secun[' agreement reached
urth the Alliance raises a further problem 
- 
decidrng
horv WEU can transmrt rrformation to the
European Uruon rn the event of an operation
requinng mobrhsation of the CJTF xhen four of the
fifteen EU members are not members of NATO.
62 Armaments cooperation ts another rmportant
area where further unpetus N necessary. The
Westem European Armaments Group (WEAG) is
obraousll' a long u'a1' off berng able to fulfil the
funcilons of a European Armaments Agency'. rf onll'
because its membershrp urcludes countnes that are
not members of the European Uruon and mght
obstruct any dcvelopment rntended to compensate
for the latter's rnadequacres m ths area. Denmark is
not rrvolved erther in elaboratrrg or rmplementmg
decisions or actrons of the Uruon q'hrch have
defence imphcafionsat, Nomav is not an EU
member and relatrons betrveen the Uruon and
Turkey are drfficult Tlus ma1'perhaps explarn u'hy
cerlain states have decrded to deal urth these
matters elsewhere, ur the Franco4erman Agencl,
WEU, u'hrch should have had the leadrng role m
armaments pohcy and prolect coordmation. has to
an extent been sidelined from all thc maJor
prograrnmes such as the future large arcraft
(essential for boostrng projeclon capabilitl), the
modular armoured vchrcle (to be burlt b1'Germany,
France and the Umtcd Krngdom) or the Hehos 2
and Horus observatron satellrtes (rnvol',rng France,
Germanl' and possrbll' Italv and Sparn). Thrs
analvsrs is confirmed b1' the scant attentron such
matters receivc in the Brrmingham Declarationto
.[8.European Council, Edrnburgh. sectlon C; ll-12
December 1992
.19. "Mrnrsters recognised that enhanced cooperation
in the held of European armaments urll be an
important part of a European secunty and defence
rdentrtr Mlmsters noted that u'ork rvas continurng
to follow up the report on options for a European
armaments poho' and on the scope for the
establishment of a European armaments agencl'"
(pornt 10)
63. The prolect to create a Westem European
Armaments Orgarusatron (WEAO). adopted by the
National Armaments Directors in The Hague on l8
October. and due to be considered by'the WEAG
mmisters rn Ostend on 18 Novcmber. on the frrnge
of the mcetmg of the Council of Mrusters5o. uill. rf
adopted. represent a maJor qualrtatrve advance ur
tlus area WEAO, whrch w'ould be a subsrdrarl'
body, rvould have the po\\'er to anard equrpment
and programme contracts on behalf of member
states. Its drrector would report to the Councrl and
the Natronal Armaments Drectors on the
organsatlon's actrntres. The structure must be
fairly flexrble to allow for mcorporation of the
Franco4erman Agcncl' and other bilateral or
multrlateral armaments cooperation arrangements,
as it rs most rmportant for countnes sishrng to
commrt themselves to programmes of common
mterest to be able to do so, and not be held back b1,'
othcr members u'rth drfferent pnonties Conversely.
states uould strll be free to decrde whether or not to
become rnvolved m lorrt pro.lects Such an
arrangcment mav not seem ven, raflonal from a
polrtrcal pornt of vrerv, but must bc accepted as long
as cooperation takes place rn an mtergovcmmental
frameuork, if onlv to avoid gndlock situations,
rrllch. more often than not, lcad to cooperation
developrng outsrde rather than uithrn WEU
64. Grven thc profusron of peacekeeprng and
peacernforcement operatrons berng camed out
urthin multrlateral frameuorks rn countncs often
verv far au'ay from basc, rt ls mportant. urgent
even, to start addressurg the rssue of standardrsrng
equlpment To do so, an effort must be made to
secure the closest possrble involvement of both
mrlrtary authonties and polrtrcal decsron-makcrs It
u'ould be lrghlv desirable for drscussions 
- 
to be
held rvithin a WEU frameu'ork 
- 
to mclude the
Commanders-rr-Cllef, WEAG 
- 
or its successor
orgarusatron 
- 
and the Planmng Cell [n parallel.
lurks should be estabhshed rr'lth the assocrate
partners. ufuch could possrbly contnbute to
carrymg out Pctersberg operatons. and xrth thc
European Uruon authontres responsrble for
telecommurucations and advanced technologres
WEU should asscrt rtself as the European
framenork for drscussron and decision-makrng on
armaments-related matters, at least rrfule the
European Uruon has no genurne corrrmon forergrr
and secuntv pohcl' Tlus last requirement is
essentnl rf the intention is for the Uruon one dav to
21
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have a say ur armaments-related matters5l. In any
absence of resolve on Europe's part, Amencan
rndustry w'ill step rnto the breach, wrth the
implicatrons tlus *rll have for soverergnt!' and the
economv. It rs to be hoped that the Council, at its
Ostend meetrng, wrll pay' a little more heed to these
issues, whrch are not mentioned drrectly as being
among the arms ofthe current presidency.
65. Under a seven-potnt prograrnme armounced
in Brussels at a press conference of forergrr affairs
and defence mrnisters on 24 Junet', Belgrum
comnutted rtself to pursuing the development of
WEU's operatronal capabilrtres as follows:
rmplementation of the CJTF concept ur
close coordm,ation with NATO,
- 
jornt use of elements of FAWEU uruts,
llrth enhancement of the necessary
technical, Iegal and statutory means.
shanng of trarrung facrlrtres;
strengthening peacekeepurg capabilities
with a "genenc plan" to be drawn up by
the Planning Cell:
- 
harmorusation of mechanisms and
procedures wrth a lT ew to WEU oper-
ations;
- 
cooperation with the European Uruon and
possrbly wrth the OAU on peacekeeping
rn Afrrca;
cooperation wrth the European Union on
mrne-clearance and use of anil-personnel
mures.
66 The WEU Council's mrnistenal meeting,
whrch is to be held rr Ostend ur November 1996,
wrll doubtless close the current presrdency wrth
congratulations all round on the acluevement of the
above objectives. The constant strengthemng of
operational capabilitres ts a necessary condrtion for
WEU to be able to meet its comrrutnents uith
regard to collectrve defence and Petersberg tasks,
but it is also essential for issues ofa politrcal nature
51. The Union is essentially concerned for the ttme
being wrth defence industry transformation (under
the KONVER II aid programme).
52.Vox, No. 9624, page 15, 31 July 1996.
that have a beanng on relatrons wrth the European
Union and NATO to be resolved before the two
orgamsations go ahead wrth their respecttve
enlargement processes and changes rn lvorkrng
procedures, all of whrch wrll undoubtedly affect our
own Orgarusation. Tlus tendencv to "wait and
see", frequently decried in our Assembll'. is also a
reflection of WEU's urtergovemmental way' of
working, where consensus is required before any
posrtion is taken As far as the future of the
Alhance and the Umon is concemed, there is no
unanirmtv and each indrvrdual country sets tts olrn
agenda 
- 
although this does not preclude countnes
from makng jomt proposals w'luch eventuallv gam
the support of the other states. However the trme
for prevancation is past as major comrrutnents
have been made regardrng the future of the Alhance
and the Uruon and their secun[' rnplications are
rmpossible to foresee WEU - rn other words the
Councrl and its organs, including the Assembly -
must prepare itself to meet any challenges arising
from these developments.
2. The need for WEU to adapt to geostrategtc
developments in Europe
67. As the fiftreth anruversary of the 1948
Brussels Treaty approaches, marking the fifty-year
trmeframe 
- 
as interpreted by the Councrl of
Mrrusters 
- 
for whrch Article XII53 of the 1954
modified Brussels Treaty makes provision, WEU as
a whole must give thought to its role rr European
secunty and defenc€ structures. To seek to embody
Europe's rdentrty wrthrn NATO and at the same
time be the defence component of the European
Uruon is a dehcate balancrng act and one laden urth
contradrctrons rvhich, if not resolved m the very near
future, are lkely to paralyse any action WEU
attempts to take r,r'hen t is finally put to the test.
One rmportant questlon to wfuch a clear answer
must be given concems the area covered by the verv
notion of WEU. Indeed, several WEUs are
apparent rr the workings of its mrmstenal organs.
53. "... It (the Treat)') shall enter into force on the
date of the deposit of the last rnstrument of
ratrficatron and shall thereafter remain in force for
50 years After the expiry of the period of fifty
years, each of the High Contracttng Partres shall
have the right to cease to be a parry thereto provided
that he shall have prevrously given one 1'ear's notice
of denunciatron to the Belgian Government. ...".
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- 
WEU consistulg of ten full members
(which meets only urfrequentlysa);
- 
WEU at 18 (the Ten plus the three
associate members and five observers55),
- 
wEU at 13 (WEAG),
- 
WEU at 28 (ttre 18 plus the ten associate
partrrers56)
The secretanat compnses a Secretary{eneral, his
Deputies, political and secunty sectlons, a planmng
cell with analysis and urtelligence capabilities,
operatrng alongside several workrng groups,
consistrng of officials of the vanous countries,
wluch meet at 13, 18 or 28 (the Polrtico-Military
Group operates ur trryo vanants as does the Council
Workrng Group)
68. Thrs complex situation is the outcome of
decisions taken rn the aftermath of Maastncht and
at the Petersberg meeturg, in an effort to make rt
possible for virtually all westem and central
European countnes to be involved in WEU's work,
but wrthout those states (other than Greece and the
NATO allies) being required to subscribe to all the
security and defence obligations arising from the
modified Brussels Treaty. It is essential to revert to
a stncter application of the Treaty and clanfication
of the nghts and obligatrons of each country u:r
respect of the Orgamsation, mstead of granturg one
siatus or another on the basis of indrvidual ties wrth
the Alhance or the European Union, if paralysis is
to be avorded rn the event of a major difference of
opinion as to whether a Petersberg mission is
appropnate in a given case. The question has the
greatest beanng on those European members of
NATO that are associate members of WEU since
they have a power of decision as to lrhether
recourse should be had to the CJTF. If NATO
enlargement does not take place in parallel wrth that
of the European Union, it wrll create a further factor
of uncertarnty.
69. There is no ready solution to the problem but
the logical implicatron of a more careful readrng of
54. WEU programme of forthcoming meetings,
October-December 1996.
55.Iceland, Norway and Turkey; Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Ireland and Sweden.
56. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia.
Article IV of the modrfied Brussels Treaty is that
accession to WEU should be open to the European
countnes rn the Alliance Because the WEU
Declaration annexed to the Maasncht Treaty drd
not make a clear chorce in ttus connection, WEU's
ongural ratson d'etre, of guaranteeurg the collectrve
defence of its members, has become distorted. The
Petersberg mrssions and the CJTF are mere
subsidrary elements and aspects of the maur arm of
the Treaty. fu far as the European Uruon rs
concemd one must be realistic and stress that until
it succeeds in establishrng effective CFSP pro-
cedures wtuch are either accepted by all its
members or established ur the framework of
enhanced cooperatlon between those states that
want to forge ahead in thrs field, as rs already the
case wrth monetary uruoq urtegration wrll not be
feasrble. European secunty is not piecemeal and
comes at a pnce, in legal, pohxcal and above all
financial terms.
70. Convergence between WEU and other
European members of the Alliance and the
estabhshment of enhanced cooperatlon with the
European Uruon are two challenges that have to be
met for WEU to become both the European secunty
and defence identrty wrthrn NATO and the defence
component of the European Umon. There are
rnplications here for transatlantic relations, wluch,
rt is often forgotten, are rntended to be a two.way
street. The United States presence rn Europe is not
merely confined to NATO but rncludes major
polrtical and economic urvolvement Europe is a
stable market for Amencan mvesfinent and has a
trade balance that normally tips in the United States'
favour, untke the Pacific region where the opposite
applies. In political terms, the Amencans need
"legal" back-up from the Europears to secure the
intemational commuruty's acquiescence to certain
urulateral US foreign policy actions. A recent
example of this was US Secretary of State Warren
Chnstopher's miru-trip to Europe rn September to
enlist support for mrssile stnkes agamst Iraq.
71. The absence of a real @mmon foreign policy
gives the Uruted States a posrtion of supremacy in
European security and defence matt€rs.
Nevertheless, that country has nerther the means nor
the incluntion to act as the "world's policeman" and
has need of Europe, if only to take on a number of
polrtical and economrc tasks that would place an
additronal burden on the US budget. Europe is the
one paying for the reconstructlon of Bosrua and
Herzegovura, while the Americans rearm it, and for
the peace process in the Middle East to succeed in
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the face of the US farlng to make headwaf?. ena
yet the European allies do not always get a "fatr
retum", as the position wrth regard to NATO's
regional commands goes to show, or as was evrdent
rn the past when Ruud Lubbers was nominated for
the post of Secretary4eneral. However, it is also
true that a comparison of some statsttcs would
suggest that Amencan "domination" is justifieds8.
Without a real joint effort rn terms of defence
budgets, urvestnent in research and development
and lr the rndustnal sector, transatlantic relations
wrll clearly go on being dominated by the Uruted
States, rvhrch will conttnue to drctate secunt-v and
defence choices. It is therefore important for the
European members of the Alliance to endeavour to
strengthen the European secunty and defence
rdentit-v's influence wrthin NATO, in cooperation
wrth Canada, in order to ensure Europe emerges
from any reorgamsation of mrlitary structures lnth
a farr share of the responsibilities and a say in the
enlargement arrangements, given that the European
s[ates are, after all, in the "front line" should
tensions arise wrth the Russian Federation or the
other central European countnes not tnvolved, for
the time berrg, in the enlargement process.
72. In is relatrons wrth the central European
countries, Ukraine and the Russian Federation,
WEU should place emphasis on their involvement m
the preparation of jomt milrtary exercises and
possibly their participatron tn Petersberg-t1pe
operations. Brlateral or multilateral cooperation on
security and defence matters should be encouraged
57.'US Mrdeast envoy fails to seal pact", Ftnancial
Times, 29 October 1996, "US envoy suspends
Mideast role", lnternational Herald Tnbune, 29
October 1996.
58. L'Annde stratdgique 
- 
Les equilibres militaires
1996; editedby Pascal Boniface, page283.
Europe
(NAro)
Europe
(NATO
and ELD
US US
and
Canadl
GNP (1994,
$ bilhors) 6845 7 649 673'7 7 286
Defence (1995,
$ mlhons) 163 565 t78992 252 600 260742
R&D(1995,
$ mrltrons) t3 597 13 779 35 400 35 541
between member states and these countnes 
- 
and
tlus lncludes the Russnn Federation 
- 
so as to help
ease tensions that wrll undoubtedly surface upon
selective enlargement of the Nliance. WEU is not
ur a positron, given the modest resources tt
commands, to extsnd its security guarantee rn the
years to come, but it can and must 
- 
ur so far as rt is
able 
- 
establish close worktng relalons wrth all the
countnes rn that part of Europe, wrthout exception,
paymg particular attention to the Russm
Federation. The latter rs experiencing a penod of
political rrstability of urcertam outcome, makrng it
drfficult to drscern what its reaction to NATO
enlargement nught be. The proposed special
relationslup with the Alliance on the basis of a
Charter or cooperation agreement might be a
positive factor m defusrng any crisis that may break
out, but wrthout knou'rng the content and legal
standrng of such a document, rt is drfficult to form
an oprruon on how the drscussions wlll develop,
despite the optrmstrc statements of the Secretary-
General, Mr Solanase.
73 Wrth regard to the Medrterranean,
coordrntion of WEU and European Union action is
desirable. The Uruon is the south shore countries'
largest tradrng partrer and in 1995 initiated a
political dralogue wrth them through the Euro-
Medrterranean Conference. It fudrermore
commrtted itself to negotraturg C1prus's accession in
the six montls following completron of the work of
the IGC. An early settlement of the Cyprus issue
wrll strenglhen secunty and stablllty ln the
Medrterranean. It goes without saymg that the
solution to tlus issue as set out ur the decision of 6
March 1995, taken by the Council of the European
Uruonuo, carurot be consrdered as a precondrtion for
accession.
74. With Euromarfor and Eurofor as
multrnational task forces open to all WEU full
members and constrtuturg rnstruments enablmg it to
intervene in the event of a criss ln the
Medrterranean, WEU could make an actlve
59. "NATO to reach formal deal with Russia", Ifre
lndependent, 30 October 1996.
60. "In cornection with the preparation of the posrtion
to be adopted at the 36th meetrng of the EC-Turkey
Association Council, the Councrl unammously agreed
on the components of a global package concerning the
general polidcal framework for developing future
relatiors between the European Uruon and Turkey, on
the one hand, and Qprus, on the otler hand, and the
customs union with Turkey; ..."
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contnbution to promotrrg stablllty ln the region by
agreeing to let the countnes rr that area plav a full
part in those forces. In the event of protracted
delay,, rt rvould agarr fall to the United States to find
a solutron to a problem that is pnmanly'a European
responsibrlrty. Nevertheless, even now WEU does
not seern to be rr a position to glve a clear response
in tlus connection and rt rs surpnsrrg that the
Councrl's Medrterranean Group should have decrded
to suspend activrtres pendrng the decrsiors the
European Uruon urll take ur the frameu'ork of the
Euro-Medrterranean dralogue, glven that both
orgarusations have complementary responsibihties
rn this area 
- 
in the Union's case, thev are economrc
and political and rn WEU's case they concem
secunty and defence Thrs rmplies that there should
be greater cooperatron between them rr a reglon
u'hrch has just as hrgh a pnonty ur terms of
European rnterests as central and eastem Europe.
75. The WEU Assembly must contmue to assert
itself m rts capacrtv as the onl1, rrterparliamentary
component of European defence The r,r'a1. fonvard
lies tkough strengthened tres vrrth natronal
parlnments, but there is also the problem of the
wordrng of Artrcle IX of the modrfied Brussels
Treag', lmkmg the Assembly !\lth the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Councrl of Europe. In fact. the
latter bears a closer resemblance to the OSCE
Assembll, rn terms of the number of full members
and no longer has much in common with our ox-n
rnstrtutron, ufuch rather has to act as a counter-
uerght to the influence the European Parhament
wrelds rn framurg the CFSP, even though the latter
strll falls lnthrn the lntergovemmental sphere
Whrle tlus is a complex issue rnvolr.rng rnstrtutronal
relatronshrps, rt would nevertheless be desrrable to
find some solutions. The fusembly is the only'
rnstrtutron utuch ls made up of natronal
parliamentanans and has a statutory remrt to debate
European secunt)'and defence tssues. fu such, its
composition should reflect that fact, m other u,ords
t must represent the lrews of the defence, forergn
affars and European affars commrtte€s of the
parhaments of rts member states workrng together
'*ithin it
76 Renewrng the composition of the Assembly
is not, houever, enough. It has to be supported b1'a
real political and rrdeed financral commrtnent on
the part of the natronal parliaments enabhng them to
contnbute to the framrng of a secunty' and defence
policy for Europe wrthrn u'hat essentrally remaurs
an intergovemmental proc€ss, and giving them the
means of exercisrng supervisron in an arca where
the)' rarel.v have an opportunity to influence
govemment chorces. There is no consensus on this
issue because, to put it frankll', parliamentanims are
scattered about the Assembhes of the Councrl of
Europe, the North Atlantrc Council, the OSCE and
other regronal and rntematronal rnstitutrons where
secunty' issues are contrnuallv bemg discussed,
drrectll' or mdrrectly. Nevertheless each national
parhament stands alone rn rts deahngs wrth rts oun
govemment and rnterparhamentary supemsion is
non-exstent rn the mtergovemmental sphere (the
WEU Assembly has no supervison, pouers .ias-a-
r,rs the Councrl). Tlus deficrency must be made
good and the modified Brussels Treatv allorvs for
tlus, subject to amendment of Artrcle IX, provided
that natronal parliaments pledge their support for
the fusembly', ufuch rs the legal rnstrument they
have for making their uews known and the vetucle
enablmg them to contnbute activel.v to the process
of buildrng Europe's secunty and defence in the 2lst
century.
IV Conclusions
77. In ttus period of European lustory
charactensed by ever more rapid change, decisive
choices have alreadl,been or are rn the process of
berrg made It $,111 no longer do to refer vaguely to
"the longer term" or the "years to come", srrce tlus
ultrmately comes dolrn to marntaulng a stahts quo
that cannot meet the challenges that he ahead.
These no longer takc the gurse of a major (and
final?) world rvar but are of a drfferent order 
-
cconomic, technological, ecological or even social.
What can be descnbed as "low key" conflicts.
advances m telecommurucations technology wfuch
are also contnbutrng to the rise ur worldrvide
orgarused cnme and dmgs and armaments
traffickmg, masslve nugratory movements 
- 
such as
those m Afirca 
- 
that are destabilisrng uhole
continents. and entrenched balhstic mrssile and
endemic nuclear proliferation are but some of the 
-
already apparent 
- 
manifestations of nerv threats to
world secun[' WEU and the European Union, ln
their present or future configurations. cannot clarm
to play a "fire-fightrrg" or "pohcurg" role on therr
o\\n, or sit back as mere spectators of rntemational
political developments. Thev must actlely' under-
take to mfluence the course of events and promote
the basrc values they share 
- 
human nghts, re3ectron
of the use of force (except of course rr legrtrmate
selfdefence) and respect for the temtonal integrit-v
and sovereignty' of national communitres.
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78 WEU must now stnve to focus its
endeavours on the dual need to antrcipate crises and
hold rtself ur readiness to act if so required. Tlus
calls for a sustarned effort on the part of the member
statss to ensure that the Orgarusatron is better
resourced rn mrlitan'and technological terms, wtuch
requres a clear and unambrguous polrtical
commrtnent traured on the objectives defined in the
modified Brussels Treaty and on the new
peacekeeprrg and humanitarian mrssions WEU rs to
undertake in the years to come, provrdrng support to
the Uruted Nattons, the European Union and the
OSCE, and above all, acting on its own uutiatrve.
When rt can clalm to have met tlus last challenge,
there is no doubt that WEU r.lill have reached
matunty, rn that it rvill have become a maJor player
in intemational relations, lr the servrce of its
member states and even of the European Uruon,
making a decisive contnbutron to peace, security
and prospenty ur the world.
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